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This paper provides evidence about institutional investors’ attitudes and perceptions of private equity as 
an investment asset class in South Africa. In South Africa this plays an important, but not dominant role in 
the domestic institutional portfolios, representing about a reasonable asset allocation of assets of the 
institutional portfolio into private equity. Using an email survey of representatives of pension funds, 
insurance companies, property investment and asset management companies the study analyses the 
attractiveness of private equity in terms of institutional investment goals. The survey examines the 
institutional investors’ perceptions of private equity investment, namely with respect to its total expected 
returns, risk diversification, economic upliftment, capital appreciation and liabilities matching. Additionally, 
the survey looks at the institutional investors’ experiences regarding the private equity sector. The survey 
suggests that investment in private equity is likely to be done through larger portfolios, which tend to 
invest in private equity directly. Private equity is seen mainly as an earning asset class that is able to 
provide diversification benefits for investors even when portfolios already include equity and bond 
investments. The respondents are mainly concerned with shortage of data in the sector; the regulation 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background of the research 
 
Globally pension funds are beginning to invest via private equity funds of funds, or, occasionally, even in 
a private equity fund directly. Australian, Canadian and Dutch pension funds may be considered -as 
leaders in this field (Inderst, 2009). Pension funds are increasingly moving into new asset classes in a 
search for alpha. According to a recent study by SEI1 conducted in United States, there has been a 
significant increase in the percentage of pension portfolios investing in alternative assets when compared 
to 2008 and 2009. In 2008, 51 percent of pension executives surveyed said their pension portfolio was 
invested in alternatives. In 2009, that percentage increased to 53 percent. Alternative investments may 
include real estate, private equity, venture capital, hedge funds and other assets.  
 
National Treasury publishes Regulation 28 of section 36 of Pension Fund Act (no 24 of 1956) in South 
Africa. This act regulates that a maximum of 10 percent is allowed to be allocated to alternative 
investments such as a private equity and hedge funds.   
 
Private equity (“PE”) as an asset class is regarded as an alternative investment. Most regulating bodies in 
various countries restrict institutional investors in investing in private equity.  In order for institutions to 
comply with regulated requirements, they must make informed asset allocation decisions towards 
ensuring that assets are allocated efficiently. Institutional investors with inadequate knowledge of private 
equity are expected to increase their expertise in order to make wise decisions and achieve expected 
returns in this asset class which will be discussed later. Chemla (2004) and Ennis and Sebastian (2005) 
discuss private equity in pension fund asset allocation. Chemla (2004) also reviews United States “US” 
and Canadian pension funds’ investment in private equity and venture capital. During his investigation, 
the US had almost 50 percent of funds allocated to private equity during the year 2002. 
 
Unfortunately, the majority of institutions with inadequate knowledge of the private equity asset class 
have inefficient allocation of capital to the asset class. Many investors rely on intuition in their asset 
allocation decisions (Kaiser, Schweitzer and Wu, 2010).  Anson (2006) contends that alternative assets, 
including private equity, are generally a subset of an existing asset class and that investment in these 
subsets are simply part of different investment strategies. Though academic research has provided 
extensive coverage of the traditional asset classes, private equity as an asset class is only in its infancy. 
The primary reason for this lag is the result of limited data availability; therefore, many notable research 
questions regarding the private equity industry remain unanswered. 
 
                                                     
1SEI is a global provider of asset management, investment processing, and investment operations solutions for institutional and 
personal wealth management. Quick Poll was completed by 106 pension executives overseeing assets ranging in size from $25 











Page | 9 
 
1.2 Purpose of the study 
 
In order to measure institutional investors perception towards the private equity as an asset class, the 
researcher will conduct interviews with institutional investors who have asset allocation decision-making 
authority in portfolio management of pension funds. This study is to determine whether the institutional 
investors’ attitude correlate with their asset allocation decisions in modern portfolio theory. By learning 
how institutional investors view private equity, this will provide a context to view issues around investing 
in private equity related investments. 
 
1.3 Research objectives 
 
The primary aim of this study is to investigate perceptions of private equity by South African institutional 
investors in an institutional portfolio. Specifically, the research will attempt at accomplishing the following 
objectives:  
1. To conduct in-depth literature research on private equity industry locally and globally, risk and 
return characteristics of private equity asset class, asset allocation decisions, portfolio 
management and regulatory environment of private equity locally and global. 
2. To understand perceptions of South AfricaN institutional investors towards private equity as an 
asset class. 
The first objective will be attained through literature review and the second will be conducted through 
qualitative empirical researching. 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
 
Research methods will consist of interpreting and comparing/contrasting primary sources. There will be  
also use biographical and historical materials in order to establish attitude towards the private equity 
investment, regulations, asset-allocation decisions, current landscape and perceptions towards this asset 
class. This study will be conducted towards South African institutional investors who are responsible or 
managing institutional portfolios. A primary source of research method, the researcher will make use of a 
survey. A survey gathers data at a particular point in time with the intention of describing the nature of 
existing conditions can be compared, or determining the relationship that exist between specific events. 
 
1.5 Scope and limitations 
 
This study therefore will be conducted in South Africa to institutional investors. The limitations of this 
study's approach are considered twofold. Firstly, due to the methodology approach to the study's 
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participants. In fact, the author considers the empirical chapter in itself as a potential ground for further 
research which eventually must be extended through further literature field interpretation and further 
developed tests.  
 
Secondly, this study does not propose explaining or even giving an educated indication of levels of return 
to institutional investors in the Private Equity investment asset class, as this analysis would need to be 
based on an exact, time-sensitive evaluation of performance, adjusted for market and risk factors. 
Instead, this study is solely concerned with the perception of individual observations of private equity. 
 
1.6 Organisation of research 
 
Following the introductory section to the dissertation topic, the subsequent chapter will provide a literature 
overview on private equity, focusing (i) on the private equity industry locally and globally, (ii) risk and 
return characteristics of the private equity asset class, (iii) asset allocation decision literature review, and  
(iv) a broad overview of portfolio management in the private equity context and regulatory environment of 
private equity both locally and globally. A closer comparison with public market and industry performance 
is offered. 
 
Chapter four, represent the chapter of empirical results in this study. For clarity of presentation, this 
chapter comprises an introduction to the problem, data overview and interpretation. 
 
Finally the last chapter of this study will summarise the findings, highlight key findings and outline 
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2 Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
This chapter contains a review of literature and research that has been conducted on the topic of private 
equity industry. The chapter begins with a discussion about the private equity industry highlighting 
various academic researchers who have given a comprehensive overview of the industry. The chapter 
also gives a brief history of the private equity industry. Furthermore the chapter discusses key definitions 
that evolve around private equity, typical structure of a private equity fund and highlights latest trends in 
the local and global private equity industry. The chapter concludes with a review of private equity risk and 
return characteristics, performance of this asset class and regulatory framework both locally and 
internationally.  
 
2.1 Private Equity industry 
 
Various authors and industry associations have given differing sets of definitions of private equity. Private 
equity itself is part of the wider alternative investment universe, which comprises asset classes such as 
hedge funds, real estate, physical commodities, currencies and interest rates. “Private equity is risk 
capital provided in a wide variety of situations, ranging from finance provided to business start-ups to the 
purchase of large, mature quoted companies, and everything in between” (Bance, 2002). Various 
researchers give a comprehensive overview of  private equity2 .  
Private equity investing is often divided into five broad categories, as outlined below: 
 
Figure 1 : Areas of private equity investment 
 
Buy-outs are examples of private equity investments in which investors and a management team pool 
their own money, usually together with borrowed money, to buy a business from its current owners. 
 
                                                     
2 Kaplan and Stein (1993), Gompers and Lerner (1997), Black and Gilson (1998), Gompers (1998), 
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2.2 History of private equity 
 
The history of private equity is best described by analysing the developments in the United States during 
the second half of the 20th century. The first professionally managed private equity investments in the 
United States date back to the formation of the American Research and Development Corporation (ARD), 
a publicly traded, closed-end Company, in 1946.  
 
“As the wealth distribution in the U.S. was becoming concentrated in the hands of financial institutions 
rather than individuals, the ARD founders hoped to (i) create a private institution that attracted 
institutional investors and (ii) provide capital and managerial expertise to acquired businesses. At the 
same time, the development of the ARD paralleled the post-war creation of similar professional 
organisations managing Venture Capital investments of wealthy families. Other private equity 
investments were funded on a deal-by-deal basis by syndicates of wealthy individuals, corporations, and 
institutional investors organised by investment managers” (Fenn  and Liang, 1996). 
 
According to Loos (2005), as a direct response to the short supply of private equity capital throughout the 
1950's, the U.S. Congress undertook several initiatives to remedy this situation. Most importantly, it 
passed new legislation with the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, which paved the way for the 
establishment of Small Business Investment Companies. 
 
The boom of private equity during the 1980s was supported by relaxed regulatory changes. The private 
equity industry took advantage of the U.S. Congress decision concerning registration as investment 
advisers: registration under the Investment Advisors Act was not necessary when advisors have fourteen 
or less clients: hence, many partnerships restricted the number of Limited Partners to fewer than 
fourteen. Soon after, the small Busines  Investment Incentive Act of 1980 rendered this limitation 
unnecessary by redefining private equity partnership as business development companies, thus 
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2.2.1 Key definitions of private equity terms 
 
For the purpose of this study a private equity as an asset class is based on the relationship between an 
institutional investor and an intermediary (the PE fund) as per Table 1 below. A PE fund is usually 
structured as a limited partnership, and is comprised of a management team (the general partner), which 
manages the investments of the limited partner. The PE fund's investors hold shares of the limited 
partner.  
 
PE funds invest the institutional money in private (target) companies and these investments are typically 
structured as equity claims. An investment vehicle is created for each individual transaction, capitalised 
by the PE fund and other third parties, mainly debt providers and mezzanine investors. This transaction 
vehicle will later acquire shares in the target company and/or will merge somehow with it, thus creating a 
unique opportunity to specify its capital structure and to design particular claims and incentive structures. 
 
 PE fund investments can be syndicated among other PE funds. The contributing PE funds hold a 
majority of equity voting rights and hence play a role as active investors. This entails monitoring of the 
entity, managing  the operations and restructuring the target company to create value. In a syndication 
scenario of PE funds, one of the funds will be the lead investor, joined by further equity investors such as 
the target company management teams, its employees or the former owners. The PE fund's 
engagements are terminated at the so-called exit either by being written off or sold. For the purpose of 
simplicity, VC and PE will be used interchangeably. To justify this, venture capital (VC) investments make 
up the other strand of the PE asset class. VC investments typically invest in early stages of growth 
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Table 1: Basic definitions 
 
Source: Basic definitions. Adapted from Inside Private Equity: The Professional Investor's Handbook, by 





As noted above private equity funds are generally structured as limited partnerships. “A partnership is 
simply a contract, whereby two or more individuals consent to carry on an enterprise, contribute to it, by 
combining property, knowledge or management, and to share its profit” (Mathonet and Meyer, 2007).The 
most basic form of partnership is a general partnership, in which all partners manage the business and 
are personally liable for its debts, as every partner is both an agent and principal of the firm and may thus 





































For the purpose of this study we use the term private equity funds investment 
program as a generalisation for in-house programs, captive or independent 
fund-of funds focusing on investments in private equity funds. Private equity 
funds are unregistered investment vehicles that pool money to invest in 
privately held companies. Fund management companies – also referred to as 
private equity firms – set up these funds to attract institutional investors. 
 
As used herein, the term general partner refers to the private equity firm as an 
entity that is legally responsible for managing the fund’s investments and who 
has unlimited personal liability for the debts and obligations when the fund is 
set up as a limited partnership. 
 
Fund managers are the individuals involved in its day-to-day management. The 
group of fund managers forms the private equity fund management team that 
will include the carried interest holders, i.e. those employees or directors of the 
general partners that are entitled to share in the ‘super profit’ made by the 
fund. 
 
The term limited partners refers to the private equity fund’s passive investors 
responsible for the management of a program. Again, we interpret a limited 
partner as the institution that provides the capital. Investment managers are 
the individuals that represent the limited partner. 
 
The portfolio companies are the companies in which a private equity fund has 
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As these liabilities can be significant, another ‘asymmetric’ form for investment vehicle has developed: 
the limited partnership. In this partnership certain limited partners relinquish their ability to manage the 
business in exchange for limited liability for the partnership’s debts (Gilligan and Wright, 2010). 
Figure 3 : Structure of a private equity fund 
 
 
Source: Structure of a private equity fund. J-Curve Exposure: Managing a Portfolio of Venture Capital and Private 
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2.2.2 A typical life cycle of a fund 
 
A PE fund is a long-term investment. Typically, investors’ capital is locked up for period up to 10 years—
the standard term of a private capital limited partnership. During this long investment period, a fund will 
normally go through five stages of development (Mathonet and Meyer, 2007). 
 
The first stage is the fund raising stage where the venture capital firm raises capital from outside 
investors. Capital is committed—not collected. This is an important distinction noted above. Investors 
sign a legal agreement that legally binds them to make cash investments in the fund up to a certain 
amount. This is the committed, but not yet drawn, capital. The general partner will also post a sizeable 
amount of committed capital. Fundraising normally takes six months to a year. 
 
The second stage consists of sourcing investments, reading business plans, preparing intense due 
diligence on start-up companies and determining the unique selling point of each start-up company. This 
period begins the moment the fund is closed to investors and normally takes up the first five years of the 
venture fund’s existence. During stage two, no profits are generated by the venture capital fund. In fact, 
quite the reverse, the venture capital fund generates losses because the venture capitalist continues to 
draw annual management fees (which can be up to 3.5 per cent a year on the total committed capital). 
These fees generate a loss until the venture capitalist begins to extract value from the investments of the 
venture fund. 
 
Stage three is the investment of capital. During this stage, the venture capitalist determines how much 
capital to commit to each start-up company, at what level of financing, and in what form of investment 
(convertible preferred shares, convertible debentures, etc.). At this stage the venture capitalist will also 
present capital calls to the investors in the venture fund to draw on the capital of the limited partners. 
Note that no cash flow is generated yet; the venture fund is still in a deficit. 
 
Stage four begins after the funds have been invested and lasts almost to the end of the term of the 
venture capital fund. During this time the venture capitalist works with the portfolio companies in which 
the venture capital fund has invested. The venture capitalist may help to improve the management team, 
establish distribution channels for the new product, refine the prototype product to generate the greatest 
sales, and generally position the start-up company for an eventual public offering or sale to a strategic 
buyer. During this time period, the venture capitalist will begin to generate profits for the venture fund and 
its limited partner investors. These profits will initially offset the previously collected management fees 
until a positive net asset value is established for the venture fund. 
 
The last stage of the private equity fund is its windup and liquidation. At this point, all committed capital 
has been invested and now the fund is in the harvesting stage. Each portfolio company is either sold to a 
strategic buyer, brought to the public markets in an initial public offering, or liquidated through a 
bankruptcy liquidation process. Profits are distributed to the limited partners and the general partner now 
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These stages of a venture capital firm lead to what is known as the J-curve effect as shown on Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 : Life cycle of a private equity fund 
 
 
Source: Life cycle of a private equity fund. J-Curve Exposure: Managing a Portfolio of Venture Capital and Private 
Equity Funds by Mathonet, P. and Meyer, T. 2007. Adapted with permission. 
 
 
2.2.3 Local and global private equity industry 
 
According to the South African Venture Capital Association (“SAVCA”) survey conducted in 2010, 
investment trends of the South African VC asset class since 2000, compared to the investment trends of 
the local PE sector, the South African Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) and investment trends in the 
United States VC asset class have increased as shown on Figure 6. 2001 was used as the base year for 
comparison. The data indicates a disproportionate growth in the South African VC asset class between 
2005 and 2009 when compared to the relative decline of investment in the US VC asset class. Although 
this is a positive trend, it needs to be borne in mind that the growth builds off a low base. Figure 6 also 
depicts investment in the South African VC asset class followed a similar trend as that of the SA GDP 
with the spike in VC investment activity in 2008 probably matching the spike in the SA GDP in 2007 – VC 
fund managers spending money in 2008 based on their ability to raise money on the strength of the 













Page | 18 
 
Figure 5 : Investment trends of the South African Venture Capital 
 
 
Source: KPMG and SAVCA Survey 2009 
 
 
Figure 6 : Stage of investment by equity range   
 
Source: SAVCA 2010 
 
The majority of venture capital investments take place in a start-up phase. VC’s are likely to be more 
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Figure 7 : Investment activity in South African Venture Capital industry 
 
 
Source: SAVCA 2010 
 
 
Figure 7 indicates an increase in investment activity starting as far back as 2001 but picking up 
considerable speed in 2004 with the introduction of government investment and the 2007/2008 launching 
of a number of private VC fund managers. The question is whether or not this will continue into the future 
or dwindle in line with the apparent downturn indicating fewer transactions recorded in 2009 and 
seemingly in the first half of 2010 as depicted on Figure 8. 
Figure 8 : Investments and Funds raised in the private equity sector in South Africa 
 
 









2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 



























Page | 20 
 
2.3 Influence of BEE in private equity 
 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), as defined in the Financial Sector Charter of South Africa, means 
the economic empowerment of all black people, including women, workers, youth, people with disabilities 
and people living in rural areas, through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies. The definitions 
used in this survey for BEE companies are stated below: 
 
o ‘Black companies’ refers to companies that are more than 50 per cent owned and are controlled 
by black people. Control centres are based on the authority and power to manage assets, the 
determination of policies and the direction of business operations. ‘Black people’ refers to all 
Africans, Coloureds and Indians who are South African citizens and includes black companies. 
o ‘Black-empowered companies’ refers to companies that are more than 25 per cent owned by 
black people (but not more than 50 per cent) and where substantial participation in control is 
vested in black people. 
o ‘Black-influenced companies’ refers to companies that are between 5 per cent and 25 per cent 
owned by black people and with participation in control by black people. 




2.3.1 BEE participation in private equity 
 
Most Black Economic Empowerment transactions are funded by Private Equity and Venture Capital. 
According to the KPMG and SAVCA Private Equity and Venture Capital Survey in 2009, government 
controlled entities and fund managers that are themselves black-owned, empowered or influenced had a 
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Source: KPMG and SAVCA Survey 2009 
 
 
2.3.2 Economic and social contributions of private equity 
 
A survey done by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and SAVCA in 2010, aimed to 
provide the market with real data on the changes that portfolio businesses undergo post private equity 
investment.  The study examined the three year period from 2005/2006 to 2008/9 and the achievements 
undertaken by private equity-backed companies.  One of the key highlights that emerged from the study 
was the fact that over 70 per cent of respondents indicated that post private equity investment their 
organisations achieved black empowerment, black-ownership or became community broad-based 
enterprises.  Prior to receiving private equity investment, 59 per cent had no empowerment shareholding 
at all. In addition, the study also highlighted the broader social and economic impact that private equity 
has had in South Africa as a whole. 
 
In Europe, the European Union Chamber of Commerce conducted a study around social and economic 
impact in China. “Firstly, PE-backed companies created more jobs and paid higher wages and salaries. 
Second, innovation and efficient spending on research and development improved as they are important 
goals for PE-backed firms. Finally, the study found that PE is a strong contributor to the government’s 
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2.4 Performance of private equity 
 
Early papers mainly address the performance on the fund level. Gompers and Lerner (1997) were the 
first to empirically analyse the return of private equity funds relative to investments in public equity. 
Prominent examples for research tackling the returns of private equity on the partnership level are Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005), Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003).  They all 
conclude that private equity investments do outperform public markets on an aggregate level. Adding a 
risk-adjustment, as pursued by Ljungqvist and Richardson, supported these findings. Jones and Rhodes-
Kropf (2003) explicitly assess the risk premium in private equity investments. Some recent studies, such 
as Schmidt (2003) and Gottschalg, Phalippou, and Zollo (2004) question the positive alpha returns of 
private equity investment. 
 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) analysed private equity performance on the fund level. They calculated 
Internal Rate of Return (“IRR”), Public Market Equivalent3 (“PME”) and for 746 private equity funds 
obtained from Venture Economics in the U.S.. They found a huge difference in fund returns. Analysing 
PMEs based on net cash flows they found a relative underperformance (outperformance) of PE 
investments to S&P 500 on an equally (value) weighted basis. Using average fees and carried interest 
figures they concluded that on average, PE outperformed the S&P 500 gross of fees and do not analyse 
risk adjusted performance measures. Focusing on dynamics of fund returns, they find a strong 
persistence of fund returns and improving returns with increasing management experience of PE funds. 
 
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) studied the returns to investments in 73 private equity funds in U.S. by 
a large limited partner in funds raised between 1981 and 1993. They calculated IRR, Excess IRR and a 
Profitability Index for investments on fund level. In their analysis they scaled PE relative to S&P 500 and 
NASDAQ Composite Index and observed an outperformance of 6-8 per cent for PE investments based 
on IRR. They calculated a risk-adjusted profitability index discounting cash inflows at the cost of capital. 
The cost of capital is estimated on fund level using Fama and French’s (1997) Industry Cost of Equity 
figures.  On this risk adjusted basis they observed excess alpha returns on the PE fund level. Their focus 
was on a general analysis of private equity fund’s cash flow patterns, drawdown rates and performance 
determinants.  
 
L (2005) focused on the individual portfolio company level and work out the aggregate performance of 
private equity investments. He stressed the importance of adjusting for survivorship bias, which 
potentially arises due to the high failure rate of private equity investments. In his paper he measured the 
mean, standard deviation, alpha and beta of venture capital investments using a maximum likelihood 
estimate that corrects for selection bias. He found that mean log returns of individual portfolio 
investments are around fifteen percent, though arithmetic mean returns are much higher and generate an 
arithmetic alpha of 32 per cent. 
                                                     
3 Kaplan and Schoar (2005) define PME as a ratio of the discounted value of all cash outflows 
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Schmidt (2003) analysed the risk-return characteristics of 642 U.S. private equity investments and 
investigated how this asset class can be used for diversification purposes. He found that Leverage 
Buyout returns are less skewed than VC returns, indicating crucial importance of investment selection 
skills in the VC industry. To assess the relationship between PE and PM investments he generated cash 
flow streams of public market investments imitate cash flow patterns of PE investments. Schmidt (2003) 
performed a bootstrap simulation to observe risk-return characteristics of portfolios comprising PE 
investments. He showed that the average portfolio size of 20 to 28 PE investments eliminates over 80 per 
cent of non-systematic risk and thus can be regarded as balanced. Furthermore, PE investments bare 
higher levels of non-systematic risk compared to PM investments, with the exception of mezzanine. 
Schmidt (2003) concluded that PE as an asset class offers diversification potential, as correlations factors 
with public markets are low. The different PE investments categories are very heterogeneous regarding 
risk, return and correlations with public market investments. 
 
Gottschalg, Phalippou, and Zollo (2004) analysed returns of more than 500 PE funds, derived from the 
records of Venture Economics. Based on net cash flows they find that realised funds underperform public 
stock-markets. As PE performance is pro-cyclical relative to public markets, desirable hedging properties 
do not justify low return levels. Computing average CAPM-betas of 1.7 and 1.6 for BO and VC funds 
respectively, PE funds are exposed to non-negligible risk that should command a return premium over 
public markets rather than the observed discount.  
 
The work closest to that presented in this paper is that of Kaserer and Diller (2004), who analysed the 
risk-return relationship of 794 European PE funds to assess the role of PE in the asset allocation. They 
measured performance of the PE funds relative to the MSCI Europe and the J.P. Morgan Government 
Bond Index in terms of IRR based excess returns and PMEs. Results reveal a slight underperformance of 
the average realised fund relative to the MSCI Europe (PME based). Buy-out funds exhibit consistently 
higher performance figures than VC funds.  
 
To add a risk adjustment they calculated Sharpe Ratios and found significantly lower ratios for PE funds 
compared to the MSCI Europe. They estimated correlations between PE and the public benchmarks to 
be 0.8 (MSCI Europe) and 0.1 (Bond index) based on the PME and Bond Market Equivalent (BME) 
figures. Using these parameters, they showed that adding PE to a portfolio comprising MSCI Europe and 
J.P. Morgan Government Bond Index shares triggers diversification effects. They conclude that private 
equity will have a substantial role in asset allocation. As indicated above there has been various studies 
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2.5 Risk and Return review 
 
Given the volume of literature on venture capital, it may seem surprising that there are only few papers 
analysing the returns on private equity. The main obstacle to research has been the limited availability of 
data.  
 
Woodward and Hall (2003) estimated that average performance was 20 per cent per year, abnormal 
performance was 8.5 per cent per year, and beta was 0.86. Peng (2001) found an average return of 55 
per cent per annum (1987-1999) and estimated beta ranges from 0.8 to 4.7. Finally, Cochrane (2005) 
reported a 59 per cent annual average (arithmetic) gross return and a corresponding alpha of 32 per 
cent. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) used a proprietary data set to analyse the investment behaviour 
of PE funds in the U.S. MacIntosh (2003) presented data on exits and returns in Canada and the U.S. 
Manigart et al. (1996, 2000, 2002a,b), Hege, Palamino and Schwienbacher(2003), and Schwienbacher 
(2003) had similar data that compares Europe and the U.S. 
 
2.5.1 Measuring risk and return 
 
RisCura Fundamentals4 launched a comprehensive quarterly performance report in 2010 for South 
African private equity that highlights the impressive track record of the local industry over the past ten 
years. The rigour, frequency and methodology of the survey bring performance measurement in line with 
global best practice and is expected to advance interest and participation in local private equity investing. 
 
Preparation for the performance report has taken the best part of a year. The initiative arose from a need 
within the industry for a benchmark against which to measure performance. Since the majority of 
investible South African private equity funds in the mid to upper end of the industry are tracked by the 
survey, comprehensiveness is assured. 
 
The enhanced information flow on private equity is consistent with the trend in the industry of increased 
transparency, which in turn underpins investor relations, helps to manage investors’ expectations, and 
reduces the perceived risk of the asset class by giving account of historical performances. 
 
Returns are presented as pooled net IRRs, which reflect aggregate performances for the private equity 
industry, taking account of cash flows into and out of the industry. This method has the benefit of 
implicitly giving larger funds a greater relative weighting and thus creates comparability with ALSI-returns. 
Returns are measured net of fees, expenses and carried interest. 
 
The findings from the first performance survey are positive for the industry. The pooled net IRR for private 
equity beats the compound annual growth rate from the FTSE/JSE All Share Index (ALSI), the FTSE/JSE 
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Financial and Industrial Index and the BEASSA All Bond Index (ALBI) on a three-year, five-year and a 
ten-year view as per Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 : Private Equity outperforms listed index in South Africa 
 
 
Source: Private Equity outperforms listed index in South Africa. Riscura South Africa Private Equity Performance 
Report by RisCura Fundamentals, 2010. Adapted with permission 
 
  
Figure 11: Public Market Equivalent performance vs. listed index 
 
Source: Public Market Equivalent performance vs. listed index. Riscura South Africa Private Equity Performance 
Report by RisCura Fundamentals, 2010. Adapted with permission 
 
 
The PME calculation confirms that private equity outperforms the ALSI total return index over all three-
time horizons as per Figure 11.The survey findings are similarly positive for the South African private 
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outperformed US and UK private equity over a three-year, five-year and ten-year period as shown in 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2: SA and UK private equity over a three-year, five-year and ten-year period 
  
  
*Source: RisCura Fundamentals 
#Source: British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association Private Equity and Venture Capital Performance 
Measurement Survey 2009. 
 
The general conclusion from these papers regarding private equity performance is mixed and these 
differences can be partly attributed to the quality of the data. 
 
Another approach to comparing asset class returns is the PME measure, which invests private equity 
cash flows in a public index to determine out/under performance. A value greater than 1 implies 
outperformance by private equity. 
 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) have exclusive access to the (albeit anonymised) fund-by-fund data from 
which Venture Economics derive their published aggregate private equity performance data. This is a 
valuable improvement on the use of aggregated data, though the fund-by-fund return data remain subject 
to the limitations of self-reporting and accounting treatment noted earlier. These limitations can create 
substantial variation at the individual fund level which Kaplan and Schoar, to their credit, fully 
acknowledge. To this point, they document large differences in performance across funds. These excess 
returns, however, do not take into account the timing of the cash flows (which is not available) or the risk 
profile of the portfolio companies (due to anonymity).  
 
As an alternative strategy, Cochrane (2005) and Quigley and Woodward (2002) performed a study in 
U.S. that focused on the individual portfolio company (rather than fund) level, and then, using various 
assumptions, assume the aggregate performance of private equity investing. These papers are important 
and document interesting facts about private equity investments.  Using different assumptions, Quigley 
and Woodward (2002) report lower returns for private than for public equity. They report a method for 
building an index of venture capital that can be used in much the same manner that the NASDAQ and the 
S&P500 are used as indices of the prices of common stocks.  
Because venture capital is traded infrequently in thin markets, the technique uses a repeat-sales 
approach plus a correction for the selection bias present in the observations on value for private equities. 
The approach is used to estimate an index for venture capital using the Sand Hill database, a 
comprehensive database of pricing events for venture companies’ private rounds of funding and ultimate 
disposition. The estimated price index was rather flat in nominal terms between 1987 and 1995, after 
  10 year 5 year 3 year 
SA Pooled IRR* 21.7% 21.2% 11.5% 
UK Pooled IRR# 13.1% 17.3% 4.40% 
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which it rose steadily until 1998, and abruptly through 1999. It falls sharply in the last half year, 1999 II. 
The confidence interval widens considerably in 1999. 
 
2.5.2 Establishing a benchmark 
 
Comparing investment performance is essential for private equity investors and fund managers alike, but 
the lack of reliable tools often make it difficult to establish consistent and comprehensive benchmarks. 
Many financial data providers are competing to offer in-depth comparison tools for other investment 
classes but data is very limited for private equity. There is enough regular information on for publicly 
traded holdings, quantitative performance evaluation is straightforward. Standard indices, such as the 
S&P500 and All Share Index, provide measures of overall market returns. For non-traded holdings, such 
as venture capital, investors have no similar benchmark. 
 
Frei and Studer (2004) highlighted various reasons why performance measurements for PE investments 
are more complicated than for traditional financial investments. First, most private equity investors make 
a capital commitment which is eventually called on by general partners at his discretion when an 
interesting investment opportunity is found. Thus limited partners usually provide capital to the fund in 
numerous tranches over the investment period, the precise timing of which is not determined at the time 
of commitment. Despite that realisation of investment occurs over time it may take up to 10 years in 
building a portfolio and liquidating it. Therefore this may yield irregular cash flow streams both from the 
investor to the fund and back to the investor from the fund. Timing of these cash flows at the time is 
unknown.  
 
Frei and Studer (2004) continued that private equity investments are not only long-term but illiquid by 
nature. Even though net asset value of private equity investments is usually stated on a quarterly basis, 
the sale achieved in a secondary transaction can be different from general partner’s valuation. Lastly, the 
performance attributed to private equity investments in their early years is not meaningful as an indicator 
of final performance, and actual performance is only known with certainty once nil investments are 
realised and the fund is fully liquidated. It should be clear that this can lead to some severe obstacles in 
performance measurement. 
 
There are a number of methodologies that can be used to measure the performance of private equity 
investments. The author will review some of the methodologies used by private equity investors to 
measure performance.  
 
2.5.2.1 Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
 
The private equity industry’s de facto standard for measuring returns is the internal rate of return (IRR). In 
fact, Meyer and Mathonet (2005) point out those Venture Capital associations, the Association for 
Investment Management and Research, and the CFA Institute consider the IRR to be the most 
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IRRs can be calculated from the inception of a fund to any point in time during the fund’s life up to and 
after termination. The IRR represents a percentage rate of return at which the net cash flows of a fund 
over time can be discounted back to zero at the present. In practical terms, the IRR is the average “work-
rate” of a limited partner’s investment  Metrick (2007). 
 
Two critical decisions must be made when calculating an IRR. The first is whether to use cash flows that 
are gross or net of fees and carried interest to the limited partners. This decision can have a great impact 
on the calculation of the IRR, especially late in the fund cycle when the majority of disbursements are 
made by the fund. If calculated gross of fees, the IRR will overstate the true IRR of the fund to limited 
partners. Second, Metrick (2007) illustrates the importance of the decision of whether or not to include 
residual values in IRR calculations. In practice, the majority of participants in the private equity industry 
consider the residual value reported by the general partners to be the terminal value when calculating 
IRR. However, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) reason the majority of residual values reported by funds 
after the ten year point should be written off as “living deads”5. 
 
The standard calculation for the IRR since inception is that which satisfies the following equation:  
 
Equation 1: Internal rate of return 
where: 
CFi = Net Cash Flows to the Fund; 
RVn = Residual Value (can be written off); and 
IRR = Internal Rate of Return. 
 
Meyer and Mathonet (2005) illustrate how a private equity fund IRR follows a J-Curve or hockey stick 
pattern over the fund cycle. The early years of a fund are generally the period of capital calls from limited 
partners to finance a fund’s investments in portfolio companies. As a result, the IRRs of funds early in 
their life cycles are generally negative or close to zero. This period of low returns is exceptionally bad for 
venture capital funds and has been termed the “Valley of Tears.”As a fund progresses through its cycle, 
the IRR generally increases at an increasing rate before levelling off close to the end of the fund cycle. 
 
The major advantage of using IRR is that it makes the appropriate adjustments for the time value of 
money when dealing with the heterogeneous nature of fund cash flows. Specifically, the IRR represents a 
cash-weighted rate of return where all relevant cash flows are weighted accordingly. That is, those cash 
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flows that take place early in the fund cycle are given greater weight than those taking place later. One 
other advantage of IRR is that it is intuitive to investors. This is an advantage because IRR is simply 
calculated as a percentage rate of return, unlike other measurement techniques such as the value 
multiple which is calculated as a ratio. Another advantage is that IRR can be compared to a hurdle rate in 
order to judge the success of the fund. 
 
An effective measurement technique, IRR is not without its disadvantages. When examined in isolation, 
the interpretation for the IRR is very subjective. What constitutes a superior performance by a fund varies 
from individual to individual. In addition, the mathematics of solving for the IRR within the quadratic 
equation can present several problems. The first is that a fund could have multiple IRRs if there are 
numerous sign changes during the fund cycle. The findings of Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) suggest 
that the majority of sign changes can occur between years four and eight; therefore, interim IRRs could 
be over or understated.  
 
However, most private equity funds follow a negative-to-positive cash-flow pattern so this normally is not 
a major problem. In addition, Meyer and Mathonet (2005) point out those general partners must decide 
whether to realize short-term gains on investments to optimize IRR or to wait for longer periods of time to 
optimize return multiples and/or realized returns. Furthermore, if follow-on fundraising is dependent on 
current fund performance as suggested by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), then managers of struggling funds 
have a disincentive to keep performing. Simply, because IRR weights earlier performance greater than 
later performance, fund managers of underperforming funds have a low probability of improving 
performance. Therefore, fund raising ability will be quite diminished. 
 
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) point out that a major weakness of the IRR is that it assumes that 
capital calls and distributions are discounted at the same rate. They argue that capital calls should be 
discounted at a lower rate than distributions. They argue that capital calls should be discounted at the risk 
free rate while distributions should be discounted at a rate equal to the return of public equity securities. 
Therefore, IRRs overstate the performance of the fund relative to its risk profile. 
 
The question remains as to how one should use IRR in fund performance evaluation. In order to eliminate 
the subjectivity of the IRR, one should compare it to a hurdle rate. Grinblatt and Titman (2002) state that 
the appropriate hurdle rate for comparison of IRRs should be a rate that makes the sum of a fund’s 
discounted cash flows equal the current value of a tracking portfolio of cash flows of an appropriate peer 
group. 
 
Grinblatt and Titman (2002) stated that the appropriate hurdle rate for comparison of IRRs should be a 
rate that makes the sum of a fund’s discounted cash flows equal the current value of a tracking portfolio 
of cash flows of an appropriate peer group. According to Pearce and Barnes (2006), this peer group 
should encompass several areas to be considered accurate. First, the peer group should include funds 
with the same vintage year as the fund being evaluated. It is not logical to compare a fund raised in 1980 
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decisions. Second, the peer group should be comprised of funds from the same industry sector as the 
fund being evaluated. This allows the fund to be compared to other funds facing similar market conditions 
as well as funds with similar risk compositions. In order to control for differing levels of competition among 
funds, the peer group should be made up of those funds located within the same region as the fund being 
evaluated. 
 
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2006) point out that the major error made by those using IRR is to compare it 
with the return on public markets, such as, but not limited to, the S&P 500 index. Because indexes are 
time-weighted measurements and the IRR is a cash-weighted measurement, the two should not be 
compared. Furthermore, Metrick (2007) cautions that investors should not try to deduce the amount of 
money a fund made for them by using the IRR. Though the IRR is not without limitations, it proves an 
accepted and important measurement for private equity fund performance. 
 
2.5.2.2 Modified Investments IRR 
 
Some analysts prefer to use modified IRR measures. Fred and Studer (2004) points out that to calculate 
the Modified Internal Rate of Return (MIRR), one assumes that a single contribution is made to the 
private equity fund at the initial investment date instead of multiple contributions over time.  
 
Equation 2 : Modified Internal Rate of Return 
Where;’ 
n is the number of equal periods at the end of which the cash flows occur (not the number of cash flows),  
PV is present value (at the beginning of the first period),  
FV is future value (at the end of the last period). 
 
Modified internal rate of return (MIRR) is a similar technique to IRR. Using the formula, MIRR is quicker 
to calculate than IRR. MIRR is invariably lower than IRR and some would argue that it makes a more 
realistic assumption about the reinvestment rate. Despite this IRR is the most preferred and widely used 
measure for private equity performance. 
 
2.5.2.3 Public Market Equivalents 
 
An alternative measure to assess investment performance of PE relative to public benchmarks is the 
PME. Basically, the PME determines how many dollars one would need to invest in the chosen 
benchmark to generate a return equal to that of a one-dollar investment in PE on a present value basis. It 
assumes that intermediate cash flows are reinvested in the public benchmark and determines the value 
of the cash flows accordingly. There are several ways to calculate the PME. The author follow the 











Page | 31 
 
outflows (distributions) and the discounted value of all cash inflows. The discount rate is equal to the 
return of the benchmark investment. For investment, i the PME is defined as: 
 
 
Equation 3 : Public Market Equivalent 
 
CFOIti = cash outflow (distribution) of investment i in period t 
CFIti = cash outflow (distribution) of investment i in period t 
rbn = total return of benchmark b in period n 
 
According to Ljungqvist and Richardson (2002), if PME exceeds one, the private equity investment 
outperformed the public benchmark, while a PME of less than one reveals underperformance.  The PME 
concept resolves some of the deficits related to IRR. A key advantage of PME is the modified 
reinvestment hypothesis. It is at least feasible that investors reinvest cash distributions in public 
benchmark investments. In general it is possible to assign different reinvestment assumptions 
(benchmarks) to specified investment periods or cash flows. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) and 
Gottschalg et al (2004), for example assumed that cash inflows are debt financed and thus are 
discounted using risk-free rates, while cash outflows are invested in public equity. 
 
Frei and Studer (2004) used BO as a benchmark of venture capital against the NASDAQ Composite 
index. Both buyout and All PE investments are benchmarked against the S&P 500 index (Bloomberg 
Ticker SPTR Index) for U.S. investments and the MSCl Europe Total Return Index for European 
investments. 
 
Fred and Studer (2004) concluded that Private Equity did, on average, outperform public equity markets 
by around 5 per cent in Europe and around 3 per cent in the U.S. As stated geometric average return of 
the chosen benchmark index for the European investments (8.7 per cent) over the 15-year period from 
1988 until 2002 was 2.7per cent lower than the return of the chosen benchmark index for the U.S. 
investments (11.5per cent). 
 
2.5.2.4 South Africa and performance measurements  
 
However there is little research that has been done in South Africa that highlights returns due to lack of 
substantial data available. Missankov, van Dyk, van Biljon, Hayes, van der Veen (2006) did investigate- 
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Missankov et al (2006) calculated absolute returns and annualised deviation of returns for all funds and 
Aggregate Portfolio (aggregate return to South African private equity funds). These are compared with 
the returns of various indices for the period until March 2006. The indices used for comparisons were; 
 
the FTSE/JSE Africa All Share Index for South African listed equities; 
the FTSE/JSE Africa All Share Index; 
the FTSE/JSE Africa Small Cap Equity Index; 
the All Bond Index; 
the FTSE/JSE Real Estate Index and Property Loan Stock Index; 
the Alexander Forbes Short-Term Fixed-Interest Index (STeFI); 
the MSCI World Index; 
the JP Morgan Global Government Bond Index; 
the US Dollar 3-month Treasury Bill; 
the Hedge Fund Research Index (a funds of funds index); 
the Consumer Price Inflation (“CPI”) index. 
 
The private equity funds’ performance was compared to SA Equity, SA Small Cap Equity, SA Bonds, SA 
Property, SA Cash, Foreign Equity, Foreign Bonds, Foreign Cash and Foreign Hedge Funds of Funds, 
using the benchmarks listed above. The maximum private equity outperformance of listed SA Equity was 
33.6 per cent per annum, but the poorest fund underperformed by 3.3 per cent per annum. The average 
premium over the different time periods was 13.1 per cent per annum while the Aggregate Portfolio 
outperformed listed equities by 18.0 per cent per annum.  
 
Furthermore the results until March 2006 concluded that FTSE/JSE Africa Small Cap Index 
outperformance was 33.4 per cent per annum but the poorest fund underperformed small caps index by 
5.3 per cent per annum. The average outperformance was 8.3 per cent per annum and the Aggregate 
Portfolio outperformed by 16.8 per cent per annum. The maximum outperformance of 71 per cent per 
annum occurred relative to foreign (US Dollar) cash, while the maximum underperformance of 9.3 per 
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It was observed that the Aggregate Portfolio had returned 18.0 per cent per annum and 16.8 per cent per 
annum more than SA Equity and Small Cap Equity over the studied period. The calculated average 
outperformance of funds over the same period is 13.1 per cent per annum and 8.3 per cent per annum 
respectively relative to SA Equity and Small Cap Equity. 
 
Private Equity is a long-term investment they cannot disinvest during the life of the fund which can be up 
to 13 years. For this reason, it is reasonable to expect that investors will command a significant liquidity 
premium when comparing a private equity investment with an investment in the listed stock market. 
 
Missankov  et al. (2006) highlights that low correlation of private equity returns to other asset classes 
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2.6 Asset Allocation decision in private equity context 
2.6.1 Background of asset allocation 
 
In most developed countries, the four major asset classes are (1) common stocks, (2) bonds, (3) cash 
equivalents, and (4) real estate. The first is in terms of the investment attributes that the members of an 
asset class have in common. These investment characteristics include (a) the major economic factors 
that influence the value of the asset class and, as a result, correlate highly with the returns of each 
member included in the asset class; (b) have a similar risk and return characteristic; and (c) have a 
common legal or regulatory structure. Based on this way of defining an asset class, the correlation 
between the returns of different asset classes would be low. 
 
Kritzman (1999) offered a second way of defining an asset class based simply on a group of assets that 
is treated as an asset class by asset managers. He wrote 
 
    . . . some investments take on the status of an asset class simply because the managers of these 
assets promote them as an asset class. They believe that investors will be more inclined to allocate funds 
to their products if they are viewed as an asset class rather than merely as an investment strategy. 
(Kritzman 1999, 79) 
 
The term “asset allocation” means different things to different people in different contexts. Arnott and 
Fabozzi (1992) divide asset allocation into three types: (a) policy asset allocation, (b) dynamic asset 
allocation, and (c) tactical asset allocation. The policy asset allocation decision can loosely be 
characterised as a long-term asset allocation decision, in which the investor seeks to assess an 
appropriate long-term “normal” asset mix that represents an ideal blend of controlled risk and enhanced 
return.  
 
Arnott and Fabozzi (1992) pointed out that once the policy asset allocation has been established, the 
investor can turn attention to the possibility of active departures from the normal asset mix established by 
policy. That is, suppose that the long-run asset mix is established as 60 per cent equities and 40 per cent 
bonds. A departure from this mix under certain circumstances may be permitted. If a decision to deviate 
from this mix is based upon rigorous objective measures of value, it is often called tactical asset 
allocation.  
 
Ennis and Sebastian (2005) state that private equity returns have a high correlation of 0.9 to the US 
equity market. Therefore, diversification benefits occur primarily in equity portfolios, and private equity is 
included only in those portfolios with 60 per cent or more in equity. Portfolios with 100 per cent equity are 
found to allocate approximately 5 per cent to private equity. The authors conclude that portfolio 
allocations as large as 10 per cent are appropriate only for moderately sized equity-oriented funds and 
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There are many types of regulatory constraints. These involve constraints on the asset classes that are 
acceptable and limits on investments. Moreover, in making the asset allocation decision, consideration 
must be given to any risk-based capital requirements. For depository institutions and insurance 
companies, the amount of statutory capital required is related to the quality of the assets in which the 
institution has invested. For example, for regulated investment management companies, there are 
restrictions on the amount of leverage that can be used. 
 
2.6.2 Review asset allocation decision making by institutional investors 
 
Since there has been an industry association, SAVCA, in South African private equity, there has been a 
remarkable progress in asset allocation towards private equity in South Africa. General partners and 
assistance from the industry association have made significant impact in attracting assets. Despite the 
significant progress in South Africa, asset allocation is still at its initial stages. Moreover, few research 
studies have indicated private equity is suitably defined as an appropriate asset class for pension funds 
(Missankov et al., 2006; Chemla, 2004 and Ennis and Sebastian, 2005). 
 
Shoven (1999), Shoven and Sialm (1998), and Reichensten (2001) examined asset location decisions 
and approach portfolio optimisation in a sequential two-step procedure: choose the allocation of weights 
of the assets first and then decide upon the asset allocation of assets. Comparison of the ending wealth 
of the retirement portfolios with the same asset allocation but different allocation decisions determines the 
allocation strategy as optimal.  
 
The subject of optimal asset location was introduced in Shoven (1999) and Shoven and Sialm (1998), 
who compare the simulated distributions of wealth levels at retirement for different experience-based 
techniques of portfolio locations and allocations. The issue was subsequently revisited by Reichensten 
(2001), who utilizes mean-variance optimisation to compare optimal location decisions, for three types of 
investors (a trader, an active investor, and a passive investor) and argues that asset allocation and asset 
location decisions must be solved jointly.  
 
According to Ennis and Sebastian (2005) private equity's share of the investable capital markets is both 
useful information and a good starting point for investors considering the appropriate allocation to the 
asset class. In their study, they examined that investors who are particularly optimistic about the 
prospects for private equity can reasonably be expected to have allocations greater than 0.7 per cent of 
their assets. An implication of this fact is that all investors cannot maintain, say, a 5 per cent allocation to 
private equity unless the value of private equity interests increases tenfold relative to the value of all other 
assets. This could happen if investors bid up the prices of private equity assets, i.e., increased demand 
for them. This would lead to the formation of more venture and buyout partnerships and, in turn, the 
funding of a greater number of individual start-ups and leveraged buyouts. A material increase in the 
proportion of private equity, however, could not reasonably be expected to occur overnight. This identity 
of the value of assets that exist and investors' aggregate portfolio allocation is important to bear in mind in 
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According to Ennis and Sebastian (2005) investors need to be cognizant of their own particular 
circumstances in arriving at a decision to invest in private equity. They identify several factors that 
potential investors should consider. 
 
2.6.2.1 Access and Skill 
 
The question Ennis and Sebastian (2005) would pose to any investor contemplating embarking on private 
equity investing is this: How good do you expect to be at it? Costs are extremely high and the assets 
themselves are volatile and illiquid. Consequently, one of the most important ingredients for success is 
having highly skilled professionals with access to the best funds operating in a discretionary capacity in 
all aspects of managing the private equity portfolio. Furthermore they added that some pension and 
endowment funds have been able to attract and retain expert managers to their staff, but providing 
competitive compensation and the proper environment are problems for many funds. Others turn to 
investment management firms specialising in the field. Excellent firms of this type exist, but they add to 
the cost of private equity investing, and this must be taken into account. 
 
According to Kocis, Bachman, Long and Nickels (2009) one of the principal traits that made deals 
possible is judgment. It is still the most valuable skill that anyone brings to the investment process. Kocis 
et. al (2009) highlighted that even the demands of transparency, the prominence of private equity, the 
complexity of the regulatory environment, and the mantle of fiduciary responsibility, today’s professionals 
are required to research, document, and justify their investment decisions with increasing rigor. The skill 
sets required for these scales of operation are the same, but as teams become bigger, one job gets more 
complicated and becomes two or four. 
 
2.6.2.2 Risk Tolerance 
 
Generally private equity investing is a risky business, and investors should take account of their tolerance 
for risk as part of their decision to invest. Ennis and Sebastian (2005) added that an investor's allocation 
to equity investments is frequently taken as an indication of risk tolerance. They highlighted that there a 
direct relationship between overall equity percentage and the optimal allocation to private equity. If bonds 
make up more than about 30 per cent of the portfolio, a private equity allocation may be inappropriate. 
 
2.6.2.3 Liquidity Requirement 
 
According to Ennis and Sebastian (2005) illiquidity of private investments is another area that deserves 
attention. The less an investor needs liquidity, the greater is the tolerance for private equity investments. 
This rules them out for participant-directed defined contribution plans, but some give-up in liquidity need 
not be a significant barrier for many defined benefit pension plans, endowments, or foundation funds. 
While most of an investor’s assets will be able to be sold fairly easily on the market at a fair price, private 
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discount. Private equity investment is essentially illiquid (Sahlmann, 1990, Lerner and Schoar, 2003).  In 
addition to the illiquidity, an investment in a private equity fund has a long time horizon. The typical fund 
lasts up to 10 years, and it is usually many years before the committed capital is returned. In fact, the 
return on most funds is negative in its beginning stages, as early losses are taken before significant 
gains, a phenomenon known as the J-curve. A study funded by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) estimates that it usually takes funds between 7 and 8 years to return the committed 
capital6. This was on funds originating between 1981 and 1993, and while there was a contracting of the 
time period during the boom, many believed it will return to historic averages. 
 
2.6.2.4 Portfolio Size 
 
According to Ennis and Sebastian (2005), they also noted that the market for private equity investments 
is very small in the context of the investable capital markets. All else the same, and given a finite quantity 
of investment opportunities to go around—at least at prices investors currently consider attractive—
investors with smaller portfolios have a comparative advantage over investors with larger portfolios. This 
has become apparent as mega-size public funds seeking to establish private equity portfolios have 
wound up tilting heavily toward buyout funds, as opposed to the smaller venture funds, and toward the 
larger buyout funds. 
 
2.6.2.5 Internal Resources for Supervision 
 
The investor should have knowledgeable staff resources dedicated to supervising private equity 
investments on behalf of the fund. These are more labour-intensive than public market portfolios. Some 
staff resources are required regardless of whether the private equity portfolio is managed internally or 
externally. 
 
2.6.2.6 Capacity for Confidential Dealing 
 
Recently, another factor has arisen that may prove to further define investor compatibility with private 
equity investing. Owing to their public nature, Ennis and Sebastian (2005) noted that some institutional 
investors have faced legal challenges to their keeping confidential some of the information they possess 
as private equity investors. As general partners of private equity funds determine what information they 
are prepared to release to the public domain, some public funds may find themselves excluded from 
certain investment opportunities. It is difficult to generalize about the relative importance of these factors. 
A particular factor may be more important for one investor than another, and strength in one area may 
compensate for a limitation elsewhere. It is best to go over the factors one by one and make a judgment 
concerning their collective impact, a field that needs further research study. 
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2.7 Portfolio Management in a private equity context 
 
In this section the author will turn our attention to the portfolio management of private equity on a fund’s 
investment strategy. The section begins by reviewing the general theory of portfolio selection. Thereafter 
the author reviews modern portfolio management of a private equity portfolio. 
 
2.7.1 Theory of Portfolio Selection 
 
Fabozzi (2009) argued that portfolio selection is underpinned for the management of portfolios: portfolio 
theory and capital market theory.  
 
Portfolio theory deals with the selection of portfolios that maximise expected returns consistent with 
individually acceptable levels of risk. Using quantitative models and historical data, portfolio theory 
defines “expected portfolio returns” and “acceptable levels of portfolio risk,” and shows how to construct 
an optimal portfolio. Capital market theory deals with the effects of investor decisions on security prices. 
More specifically, it shows the relationship that should exist between security returns and risk if investors 
constructed portfolios as indicated by portfolio theory (Fabozzi, 2009: 15).  
 
Together, portfolio and capital market theories provide a framework to specify and measure investment 
risk and to develop relationships between expected security return and risk (and hence between risk and 
required return on an investment). Moreover, these theories provide a framework for measuring the 
performance of managed portfolios. 
 
According to Klier, Welge and Harrigan (2009), today's private equity landscape is characterised by two 
very different management models: the traditional form of private equity, maintaining a strong focus on 
financial engineering and selective changes in the governance model of portfolio companies; the other, a 
modern form of private equity with active involvement in decision making and a focus on value creation 
through active ownership. 
 
Traditional Investors concentrate largely on value creation through financial engineering and 
improvements to a firm's governance model by introducing strong financial incentives. The model they 
use is based mainly on a passive management model that attempts to create value at the time of the deal 
rather than during the holding period [see also Cotter and Peck (2001); Kaufman and Englander (1993); 
and Palepu (1990)]. The firms use substantial amounts of debt to acquire a target that consequently has 
to be paid down by the portfolio company. Through the aggressive use of leverage, private equity firms 
essentially create a long option on the business they acquire, with only limited equity investments as 
potential downside risk. The de-leveraging of the firm is supported by additional measures on the balance 
sheet such as the sale of non-core assets and reductions in working capital (see also Baker and Wruck, 
1989; and Zong, 2005). The aggressive use of leverage furthermore provides a solution to the free-cash-
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and the resulting obligations to make interest and principal payments imply that management has less 
latitude to invest the firm's funds in inefficient projects or for excess cash waiting around to be spent (see 
also Cotter and Peck, 2001; and Lowenstein, 1985). In addition, private equity investors transform the 
incentive systems in the companies they acquire by requiring top management to invest substantial 
amounts of their own funds in the company and introducing a stronger link between performance and 
compensation. The interests of management are aligned with the interests of the private equity firm and 
its investors, as compensation is ultimately linked to the value created between the entry and exit of the 
PE investor [see also Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) and Phan and Hill (1995)]. 
 
 The traditional private equity model is complemented by the active portfolio management approach of 
PE investors.  
 
2.7.2 Modern portfolio management of private equity 
 
The modern management model, on the other hand, takes an approach of active ownership within a 
relatively related diversified portfolio. While building on the fundamentals of traditional private equity 
investors, modern private equity investors actively influence the strategic decision-making process and 
start to leverage the scale of a related diversified portfolio in order to exploit the advantages of knowledge 
and market power (Klier, Welge and Harrigan, 2009).  
 
Active managers of private equity firms build considerable industry expertise with mostly dedicated 
industry teams. Professionals bring a diverse background from banking, consulting, and industry 
positions to enable value creation during the entire holding period of an investment. All intervention 
happens informally and businesses remain independent to secure the tradability and accountability of 
management. The active management approach builds on the strengths of financial engineering, 
governance engineering, and active portfolio management but is broadened to include so-called active 
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2.8 Regulatory framework 
 
 Institutional investors impose contractual restrictions or covenants on the fund manager in order to 
mitigate the “agency problems” associated with the investment of their capital, i.e. to ensure that the fund 
manager, as their agent, acts solely in their interests. As the contracts governing the management of the 
fund are privately negotiated between the institutional investors and fund managers, they are specifically 
designed to manage the incentives and control the potential for opportunistic behaviour not only among 
the fund managers, but even among the limited partners themselves. There are five main categories of 
such restrictions, as discussed in Gompers and Lerner (1996, 1999) and Cumming and Johan (2005b): 
 
2.8.1.1 Category 1:  Authority of Fund Manager Regarding Investment Decisions  
 
The restrictions on investment decisions limit the agency problems associated with the investment of the 
institutional investor’s capital (Gompers and Lerner, 1996). This is important, since the institutional 
investors cannot (as limited partners they are legally prohibited from interfering, otherwise they lose their 
limited liability status) interfere with the day-to-day operations of the fund. These restrictions include, first, 
restrictions on the size of investment in any one portfolio company because otherwise a fund manager 
might lower his or her costs associated with diversifying the institutional investors’ capital across a 
number of different entrepreneurial firms. Second, there are restrictions on the ability of a fund manager 
to borrow money such as in the form of bank debt and reinvest that borrowed money alongside the 
institutional investors’ capital. That type of behaviour would increase the leverage of the fund and 
increase the risks faced by the institutional investors. Third, there are restrictions on co-investment by 
another fund managed by the fund manager, as well as restrictions on co-investment by the fund 
investors. Those restrictions limit the conflicts of interest in the allocation of opportunities to different 
institutional investors of the fund, as well as limit the incentive by a fund manager to bail out the poor 
performing investments of a companion fund operated by the same manager. Fourth, there are 
restrictions on the reinvestment of capital gains obtained from investments brought to fruition. Some fund 
managers might otherwise pursue a strategy of “fame not fortune” in terms of trying to get as many IPO 
successes as possible, at the expense of a risk of losing the profits of one investment into a new 
unproven venture. Fifth, there are restrictions on the overall ability and independence of the fund 
manager to make investment decisions. Finally, there are other less common covenants on other types of 
investment and divestment decisions (such as limits in terms of timing of investment with drawdowns, 
and timing of exits). 
 
2.8.1.2 Category 2:  Restrictions on Fund Manager’s Investment Powers 
 
The covenants in the class of restrictions on investment powers also limit the agency problems in the 
separation of ownership (i.e., by the institutional investors) and control (i.e. by the fund managers) in the 
investment process. The first restriction in this class involves co-investment of the Fund Managers 
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prior funds (as described above in Category 1), but instead involves the personal funds of the Fund 
Managers. This restriction limits the incentive problems associated with the allocation of attention by the 
fund managers to different entrepreneurial firms in the fund portfolio. If the fund manager were able to 
coinvest personal funds, there would be distorted incentives for the fund manager to spend most of their 
time allocating effort to the firms in which the manager is personally invested, instead of trying to 
maximize the value of the overall portfolio (as would be expected by intuitional investors). Second, there 
are covenants pertaining to the sale of fund interests by the fund managers, since the institutional 
investor’s financial interest will be compromised by the addition of new institutional investors, and more 
significantly the loss of commitment of the fund manager who is usually also the general partner or most 
active fund shareholder. Third, key person provisions and limits of the additions of investment principals 
regarding the fund managers, since the contract is made with specific fund managers and the institutional 
investors do want the management of their capital to be in the hands of specific people with whom they 
have contracted. Finally, there could be other types of restrictions on other actions of fund managers. 
 
2.8.1.3 Category 3:  Covenants Relating to the Types of Investment 
 
Covenants pertaining to the types of investment ensure that the institutional investors ‘capital is invested 
in a way that is consistent with their desired risk/return profile. Restrictions include investments in other 
venture funds, follow on investments in portfolio companies of other funds of the fund manager, public 
securities, leveraged buyouts, foreign securities, and bridge financing. Without such restrictions, the fund 
manager could pursue investment strategies that better suit the interests of the fund managers 
regardless of the interests of the institutional investors. 
 
2.8.1.4 Category 4: Fund Operation 
 
Covenants on fund operation are designed to oversee the administrative aspects of a fund, and include 
the sale of fund interests by fund investors, restrictions against the fund manager on raising a new fund, 
public disclosure of fund matters to investors, and provisions to allow fund investors to vote to remove the 
fund manager without cause (no fault divorce clauses). The covenant restricting the sale of fund interest 
by fund investors (in this category 4) is differentiated from the covenant restricting the sale of interest by 
fund manager(as specified in category 2) because the specific fund manager action of selling pertains to 
things fund managers cannot do, whereas this category 4 pertains to administrative aspects of all 
investors. Recall that the fund manager is also the general partner or most active shareholder of a fund, 
unlike all other fund investors; hence, the different categorizations for seemingly related actions. 
 
2.8.1.5 Category 5: Limitation of Liability of the Fund Manager 
 
While categories 1-4 considered covenants constraining the activities of fund managers, this last 
category of covenants pertains to favourable awards of limited liability for the fund managers. Fund 
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fund manager fails to investment committed capital within the agreed time, and/or limited if the fund 
manager is found to be mismanaging the fund. 
 
2.8.2 Policy Considerations 
 
Cumming and Johan (2006) points out that there are three broad areas where the public policy 
framework governing the private equity market can be considered: regulation of institutional investor’s 
portfolio allocation; reporting and disclosure requirements of the private equity fund; and tax.  
 
2.8.2.1 Regulation of institutional investor’s portfolio  
 
Before looking into the regulation of the funds, Cumming and Johan (2006) looks at the regulations that 
affect the flow of institutional funds into the private equity arena. Institutional investors are subject to 
stringent regulatory oversight in view of the nature of the products they offer and their customer 
demographics. Customers of pension funds, insurance companies and banks are more vulnerable than 
regular retail investors in financial institutions as they entrust a significant fraction of their income and 
accumulated wealth to these institutions, in the hope that such institutions not only protect their wealth, 
but also enlarge it. Regulations are therefore in place to address not only the funding of these institutions, 
but also the investments of such funds to ensure that the institutions do not take advantage of the 
customers and provide the proper products that are not only appropriate for each type of customer, but 
also structured properly to meet their expectations. It is known that institutional investors’ capital 
allocation decisions are made across a range of available investments, including but not limited to, 
equities, bonds, cash/currencies, index funds, derivatives, and various forms of alternative investments 
(including hedge funds, commodities, private equity, and property/real estate). In Cumming and Johan 
(2005a), they looked at the proposed new regulation affecting the current, and especially the future, asset 
allocation of institutions. The institutions sampled in that study deemed the new regulation as the most 
important regulatory development in private equity market. In addition, they found that the new regulation 
that compels institutions to rethink their investment strategy, and especially one that encourages 
diversification into alternative investments such private equity funds, is in fact a significant factor in the 
reported potential increase in private equity investments by the same institutions. It is interesting to note 
that unsophisticated pension fund holders, insurance policy holders and bank depositors will increasingly 
fund an area of finance that was deemed to be mainly comprised of sophisticated institutional investors 
and wealthy private individuals. With such increase in levels of “public” funding directed towards the less 
regulated private equity market, it will be increasingly important that there also be public policies in place 
to protect such funds. 
 
2.8.3 Reporting and Disclosure by private equity funds 
 
The most basic reporting issue is whether private equity funds should be subject to registration 
requirements. It is common international practice that investment vehicles have at a minimum a 
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regulatory body such as Financial Services Board (FSB). Such registration or licensing enables 
regulators to obtain additional financial and operational information. In addition to that, they are required 
to be submitted by funds to the relevant incorporating bodies (such as the annual audited accounts). 
Registration or licensing however would also indirectly certify the ability of the fund managers to value 
investments and manage institutional investor capital, as proven by the license or registration, and would 
be beneficial to fund manager incumbents. As this form of certification signals a minimum quality 
standard to institutional investors and increases the confidence level of institutional investors, which 
would in turn increase the flow of funds from institutional investors to private equity funds, increased 
regulatory oversight can be achieved by requiring fund managers to include information which will allow 
investors to not only determine the “quality” of the manager, but also enable disgruntled investors with 
access to some form of independent recourse in the event of mismanagement of funds. 
 
At present, private equity funds are inclined to exaggerate returns or valuations of unexited investments 
(see Cumming and Walz, 2004). Firstly, more stringent accounting rules would reduce significantly the 
incentives (and possibilities) to exaggerate valuations of unexited investments and even the calculation of 
IRRs. This, in turn, would make the valuations more transparent and informative, thereby benefiting the 
industry as a whole. In a sense, it would avoid a “negative equilibrium” with over reporting. Furthermore, 
the survey data (and econometric analysis reported by Cumming and Johan (2005a), are consistent with 
the view that institutional investor confidence in private equity funds would be higher (and therefore more 
capital would flow from institutional investors to private equity funds) if disclosure standards required 
annual statements for overall fund portfolio valuations to be made public.  
 
Secondly, the recent “public disclosure” debate centres on the extent to which such financial information 
should be made “public”. Cumming and Johan (2005a) believed however that such additional, more 
informative disclosure of performance results should not be an issue of argument among private equity 
fund managers and their institutional investors as the “public” dissemination of such information will be 
limited to the extent that the “public” has a legal right to the information. The “public” who invest in a 
certain insurance company should have access to the details of that insurance company’s investments. 
The “public” who are required to place their pension fund with a certain company should have access to 
the financial details of that company. The “public” however will not have a right to access the financial 
report provided by a private equity fund to its wealthy private limited partner. This is also the case for a 
limited partner which is also an institution utilizing only private funds. Thus to say that the financial 
information will be made totally public will be an overstatement. This does not mean that specific 
investment details would be made public, as that level of detail would likely be detrimental to the private 
equity fund as well as its investee companies. 
 
However, annual aggregate portfolio valuations of a private equity fund do not disclose any individual 
investment details, and yet such aggregated valuations would enable institutional investors to make more 
informed decisions about whether to invest in private equity. In turn, as mentioned earlier, institutional 
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annual accounts, to allow their own “public” investors to make informed decisions about their investments 
in that institution.  
 
Third, private equity funds should be required to disclose the details of the auditors used in their 
valuations (these auditors are usually the same used to audit the fund itself, but may differ in certain 
circumstances). Auditors themselves would have to be certified with the securities regulatory body and 
follow the standards set for uniform valuation standards in private equity (such as those provided by the 
Private Equity Industry Guidelines Group or by the European Venture Capital Association). 
 
Fourth, private equity fund information disclosure quality (and as such the quality of reporting by their 
respective auditors) should themselves be assessed by regulators over time in a way that compares the 
differences between un-exited expected valuations in prior years to be reported and actual valuations of 
realized investments in subsequent years. A perceived pattern of massive differences in such valuations 
should result in investigations, and possibly a revocation of the license to operate as private equity fund 
or de-registration (and likewise as an auditor for private equity funds) in the event it is found that such 
discrepancies are a result of serious misconduct and mismanagement of funds or gross negligence. 
Regulators should disclose and inform the market of such disciplinary action in the event of problems. 
 
Regulators should also inform the market that they are undertaking such “back-testing” to increase 
confidence in the marketplace. Fifth, the private equity funds should have to disclose their management 
fees and their carried interest fees to both the investors and also to the relevant registration or licensing 
body, as this information directly affects the institutional investors’ beneficiaries and returns.  
 
This will allow current and potential investors in an institution to make informed decisions as institutional 
investors should have to disclose this information to such persons. Also, any other non-participating 
institutions will have access to such data from the regulators to also allow them to make informed 
investment decisions when making comparisons against funds competing for their investment. These 
details in no way compromise the private information of the investee companies of the private equity 
funds, but do directly relate to the returns of the institutional investors’ beneficiaries. 
 
2.8.4 Taxation and Other Legal Standards 
 
In respect of capital gains taxation and other regulatory standards that affect private equity and venture 
capital markets, it is consistent with the view that the benefits of encouraging entrepreneurship and 
innovation outweigh the forgone tax revenues, etc; however, these costs and benefits are themselves 
very difficult to precisely quantify7. 
 
                                                     
7
For U.S. evidence, see, e.g., Poterba (1989a,b); Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2001). For international evidence,see 
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The most recent European evidence is provided by Armour and Cumming (2005).Based on aggregate 
industry venture capital and private equity data spanning the period 1990– 2003 from Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
UK (as well as Canada and the US), Armour and Cumming (2005) showed that the legal environment is 
of paramount importance in measuring the supply of and demand for venture capital. Favourable tax and 
legal environments facilitated the establishment of venture capital and private equity funds and increase 
the supply of capital. 
 
Similarly, liberal bankruptcy laws stimulate entrepreneurialism and increase the demand for venture 
capital. These results have significant policy implications. The prevailing wisdom has been that deep and 
liquid stock markets are the most important determinant of venture capital investment (Black and Gilson, 
1998). It was therefore thought that policymakers wishing to foster venture capital markets could only do 
so indirectly, by implementing legal measures that are conducive to the development of liquid stock 
markets, such as disclosure laws, minority shareholder protection, and anti-director rights (La Porta, 
Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 1998; Black, 2001). An alternative route would be for 
governments to supply capital themselves, through publicly-funded schemes that would seek to stimulate 
the growth of private equity markets, with the success of such schemes being highly contingent on the 
appropriate design of incentives (Gilson, 2003). The results of Armour and Cumming (2005) cast doubt 
on both aspects of this wisdom. Armour and Cumming’s results imply that a range of legal factors may 
affect venture capital investment directly, and that a liberal personal bankruptcy law increases demand 
for venture capital finance. Consistent with theoretical work by Keuschnigg (2003) and Keuschnigg and 
Nielsen (2003a, 2004), Armour and Cumming’s results also imply that legislators may successfully 
stimulate venture capital markets by reducing direct taxation, particularly capital gains taxation. 
 
2.8.5 Related issues 
 
The ability of private equity to attract funding is not only affected by the regulatory framework applying to 
the funds themselves but also by the framework applying to investors in private equity and to the 
businesses in which they invest. For example, countries with more entrepreneur-friendly bankruptcy laws 
and lower start-up costs thereby encouraging entrepreneurship, risk-taking and innovation tend to have 
significantly larger venture capital markets relative to the GDP of that country (Armour and Cumming, 
2005). 
 
The survey of Dutch institutional investors that will be described later touched on their attitudes in this 
regard. While the results, are not directly relevant to the issue of how to regulate private equity they are 
nonetheless of interest. Indeed, it is noteworthy that some of the regulations having wide applicability 
rank as more important for attitudes toward investment in private equity than the lack of regulation of the 
industry itself. 
 
Overall the analysis provides support for the view that changes that tend to harmonise the regulatory 
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particular, the data support the propositions that harmonization of standards from the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (regulation of reporting standards and transparency), the Financieel 
Toetsingkader (Dutch regulation of portfolio management standards such as of matching assets and 
liabilities), and Basel II (international regulation of risk management and disclosure standards), all 
facilitated clarity and certainty for institutions that desired to invest in private equity. These regulatory 
changes are expected to give rise to changes in (1) an institutional investor’s asset allocation decisions in 
private equity, (2) the geographic region in which the institutional investor invests, and (3) to changes in 
the mode of investment (direct private company, direct fund, and fund-of-fund investments). While an 
examination on this basis of the question as to whether there could exist better regulatory harmonization 
measures that would better facilitate private equity investment is not possible, this evidence is 
nevertheless consistent with the view that the IFRS, FTK and Basel II are steps in the right direction. 
Cumming and Johan (2006) argue that more regulation on private equity fund disclosure lowers returns 
to private equity investing. By analogy, one might similarly argue that greater transparency in corporate 
governance lowers stock market returns, which is known to be untrue (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998) 
Similarly, Cumming and Walz (2004) show that based on more than 5000 private equity investments in 
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2.8.6 Influence of government and regulatory bodies in South Africa 
 
National Treasury and the Financial Services Board are publishers of Regulation 28 of section 36 of the 
Pensions Fund Act (no 24 of 1956) that governs the pension industry in South Africa. It regulates the 
investments allowed by South African retirement funds. 
 
The National Treasury is responsible for coordinating macroeconomic policy and promoting the national 
fiscal policy framework. Its role is defined by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and in the 
Public Finance Management Act. The National Treasury coordinates intergovernmental financial 
relations, manages the budget preparation process and exercises control over the implementation of the 
annual national budget, including any adjustments budgets. It also performs functions assigned to it in 
other legislation. On the other hand, the FSB supervises the exercise of control over the financial 
services industry in terms of several acts of Parliament that entrust regulatory functions to registrars of 
long-term insurance, short-term insurance, pension funds, collective investments schemes, financial 
services providers, exchanges and financial markets. The FSB provides information to users of financial 
products and services. 
 
Regulation 28 to the Pension Funds Act imposed limits on the investments of retirement funds. These 
were intended to protect funds against making imprudent investments once the requirement to invest in 
prescribed assets had fallen away. Over the past few years, the investment avenues available to 
retirement funds have become significantly more complicated with the incorporation of derivatives, 
structured products and foreign investments over which the trustees may have no control in terms of the 
sectors in which the foreign investment manager invests. Many of these new types of investment are not 
included in Regulation 28 as it stands today. 
 
The investment of the assets of the fund is one of the most critical of all the management functions 
carried out by the trustees. Particularly now that most members belong to defined contribution funds in 
which the investment risk is carried by members, most members will experience, directly, any losses 
suffered, or lower than average returns earned, by the fund. 
 
In South Africa, a wide range of retirement funds measured in many different ways: by size of assets, by 
type of fund, by number of members, and by the financial sophistication of trustees and their advisors. 
Many trustees are newly appointed and have received only modest education on their duties. 
 
A strong argument can, therefore, be made that such trustees should be guided in the investment of 













Page | 48 
 
2.8.6.1 The current regulation 
 
Regulation 28 prescribes maxima for various types of investment that may be made by a retirement fund. 
They are intended to guide funds which invest in their own name. The maxima relate to the fair value of 
the assets of the fund under the direct control of the trustees, and exclude from consideration insurance 
policies that provide any form of guarantee, or where performance is linked to the performance of 
underlying assets and the investment of the underlying assets conforms to the requirements of 
regulation28, and unit trusts which conform to the requirements of regulation 28. 
 
The maxima are broadly: 
 No more than 75 per cent may be invested in equities 
 No more than 25 per cent may be invested in property 
 No more than 90 per cent may be invested in a combination of equities and property 
 No more than 5 per cent may be invested in the sponsoring employer 
 No more than 15 per cent may be invested in a large capitalisation listed equity, and10 per cent in any 
single other equity 
 No more than 20 per cent may be invested with any single bank 
 No more than 15 per cent may be invested off-shore 
 No more than 2,5 per cent may be invested in “other assets”. Derivative instruments are not defined, leaving 
them to fall within this “other assets” category. 
 
There is provision for the Registrar to exempt funds from some or all of these maxima on prior written 
application. 
 
2.8.6.2 Problems with the current regulation 
 
Institutional investors are not told how to go about determining what they should do, in their particular 
circumstances, in order to achieve their objectives. There is no requirement to consult anyone, much less 
an expert. In many cases, there is no independent check on whether their selected strategy is 
appropriate to their objectives. Institutional investors can adopt a completely inappropriate investment 
strategy provided the maxima in the regulation are not exceeded. In fact, using the innovative products 
developed by insurers and others they can bypass the regulations with impunity. If any member wanted 
to challenge the investment decisions of the trustees, the member would have a difficult task to establish 
their failure to exercise their fiduciary duties.  
 
South Africa is opened up to international financial services organisations. Structured products may 
convert income into capital gains. 
 
2.8.6.3 Advantages of such regulations 
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2.8.6.4 An alternative approach 
 
The institutional investors must be encouraged to consider the risks involved and develop a prudent 
overall philosophy for the fund’s assets regardless of the type of investment manager. It is essential, 
therefore that the “gaps” are filled, and any revised regulation includes investments with insurers within 
comparable regulations to investments registered in the name of the fund. The revised regulation must be 
flexible to allow for (very rapid) new product development, as well as individual fund and member 
circumstances. Individual investment choice must be covered. 
 
There should be scope to accommodate the small fund which will invest in a pooled portfolio either with 
an insurer or a unit trust. After considering the issues, the sub-committee has recommended replacing 
the existing regulation with a process. This has been embodied in the attached draft regulation in place of 
the existing faulty regulation 28. 
 
The above mentioned concerns probed for the amalgamation of Regulation 28 and expected to remove 
foreign limits removed from the regulation, increase limit on debt issued by banks significantly, recognise 
commodities as an asset class with a 10 per cent limit, recognise hedge funds as an asset class with a 
10 per cent limit and furthermore recognise private equity funds as an asset class with a 10 per cent limit. 
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Table 3 : Draft of Regulation 28 published end July 2011 
 
Source: Financial Services Board 
 
2.8.7 Review of Institutional Investors’ Attitudes to Private Equity Fund Regulation 
 
To examine attitudes of market participants to these issues, Cumming and Johan (2005a) carried out a 
survey of Dutch institutional investors in 2005. The survey data comprise information from 100 Dutch 
institutions (pension funds, insurance companies and banks), 29 of which are currently investing in 
private equity and 35 of which plan on investing in private equity over the period 2006-2010. The data 
comprise extremely specific details on the institutions’ portfolio management practices, as well as their 
perceptions of the importance of various economic, legal and institutional factors that influence their 
portfolio allocation decisions. Institutional investors’ positions regarding their objectives in their strategic 
asset allocation were sought. More significantly, views regarding the perceived risks and hurdles faced by 
such investors were sought to determine main concerns in adding private equity as a type of asset. 
 
In their study, they list main risks and hurdles perceived by those institutions that intend to invest in 
private equity in 2006 – 2010. On average, the most important risk faced by institutional investors is the 
illiquidity of the investment and lack of performance transparency (both ranked an average of 3.7 on a 1 – 
5 scale where 5 is the highest). Private equity investments can take many years to bring to fruition 
(typically at least 2 years) in an exit event. Other important risks associated with private equity investment 
include risk of default, lack of know-how, and governance costs. As a related matter, there are legal and 
contractual issues with establishing private equity funds, and writing these contracts is viewed as a major 
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3 Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter describes the methods used to conduct this study. The chapter begins with reintroduction of 
methods used and explains with relevant literature the use of these tools. It continues to discuss data 
sampling. Thereafter the chapter concludes with a description of the data collection methods, with 
information about the instrument used, and an explanation of the data analysis methods. Finally, the 
chapter gives a summary of the population that was studied. 
3.1.1 Introduction 
 
In this research study, we will use a survey based research design. Hofstee (2006) defines a survey 
based research design as a way to essentially elicit information from a limited number of individuals who 
are presumed to have information that is sought, who are able and willing to communicate, and who are 
intended to be representative of a larger group. Surveys can range from highly structured questionnaires 
to unstructured in-depth interviews. He states that one has to be careful of type of questions asked, how 
you ask the questions, the sample size, how representative the sample, time and cost factors and ethical 
questions. 
 
Due to the nature of this study, structured questionnaires will be used to gather the information required. 
Structured questionnaires ask all respondents the same questions and give them the same options in 
answering. Unstructured interviews ask different questions of different interviews and allow digression 
from a set format, either in the questions or the answers, depending on circumstances. 
 
Mouton (2001) recommends using structured questionnaires as a tool to for investigative studies. He 
points that there are various advantages of using structured questions namely; ease of interpretation, 
ability to control interviewees, offer confidentiality to respondents and easily turn into quantitative results. 
However, Mouton (2001) highlights the disadvantages of not allowing the researcher to interact, or often 
even to observe respondents. Respondents are also limited in the depth to which the researcher is able 
to probe any particular respondent and do not allow digression from the set format.  
 
The study aims to investigate perceptions of private equity as an asset class in an institutional portfolio 
within a South African institutional environment. As the data required for performing the study is not 
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3.1.2 Data Sample 
 
Sampling refers to the process of selecting participants for a study (Gay, Mills & Airasan, 2006). A 
sampling plan will vary depending on the research question and design of the study. The sampling 
procedure that was used by the researcher was purposive sample, a non-random sample. A purposive 
sample refers to a non-random sample where a researcher selects participants who are available and 
that meet a certain criteria (Creswell, 2003). The participants were restricted to those at the researcher’s 
database who are currently investors classified under institution and participant’s willingness to partake in 
the study. The participants selected were also chosen based on the value of assets they were currently 
holding on other different asset classes. Sample size of this research study included 367 institutional 
investors in South Africa. In this study, an institutional investor is classified as an investor who is 
managing pension funds, property portfolios, asset manager and other consultants that represent 
institutions.  
 
3.1.3 Data collection and techniques 
 
The section deals with how the data was collected. It further explains the identification of potential 
respondents. Thereafter, it explains the categorisation of sections within the questionnaire.  
 
3.1.3.1 Data collection 
 
The questionnaire was distributed to the participants as follows: 
 
Institutional investors were first telephoned to enlist their participation. Some of them were either 
travelling on business, on leave or not interested in taking part into the survey. 
Those institutional investors identified and showed interest were sent a questionnaire by email with an 
attached letterhead from University of Cape Town. The letter was emailed with a cover letter requesting 
participation in this study along with a signature, indicating the nature of the researcher.  
 
The cover letter requested that if recipients were not actively involved in managing their firm's investment 
portfolio that they give the survey to someone in their company who was involved. The survey contained 
a code number to avoid potentially including duplicate responses in the analysis. The cover letter 
informed potential respondents that we would report the results in summary form and would not disclose 
any information involving individual companies.  
A second email of the survey to non-respondents to increase the response rate and to reduce potential 
non-response bias. As an inducement to increase the response rate, all interested parties were offered to 
receive an executive summary of the results after completion. 
 
It was crucial to ensure majority of the largest institutions are included in the survey. The likely difficulties 
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 Confidentiality – even though confidentiality was assured by the researcher, the researcher was 
an employee in South Africa and might have been seen as a competitor. Despite this drawback, 
participants were assured in writing that they would not be identified individually or as an 
institution in the thesis (or otherwise) and they would receive a copy of the final thesis if 
interested. 
 Time and interests in completing the questionnaire, or other personal, or policy issues. 
Respondents were assured that a copy of the results would be made available to them. 
 
 
3.1.3.2 Identification of potential respondents 
 
The nature of private equity or venture capital funds originated from accredited individual investors who 
have substantial net worth and had expectation that such funds will continue to increase. Over the years, 
there has been a noticeable increase by institutional investors to invest in this asset class. In this study, 
institutional investors are classified as pension funds, provident funds, asset managers and or insurance 
company funds. 
 
The researcher identified 367 institutional investors at the time of sending the questionnaire that were 
appropriate for the study. Among the participants identified, they were either managing a provident fund, 
pension fund or insurance fund. A profile of the respondents and their firms were obtained. The survey 
asked respondents to indicate their general opinion with closed-end statements.  
 
3.1.3.3 Questionnaire categorisation of sections 
 
The final questionnaire was divided into several conceptual areas: 
Assets under management. This area was used to identify the size of the institutional portfolio. 
Asset classes under portfolio. This area was used to understand asset classes that these respondents 
manage and have responsibility of making investment decisions. 
Investment in private equity. The respondents were asked whether they invest in the asset class. 
Goals or objectives of private equity investments. This area required respondents to select their primary 
goals in making a private equity investment.  
Benchmark on private equity returns. Respondents were asked to identify their typical benchmark index 
for their private equity returns. 
Problems regarding private equity investments. This area listed all the problems that any investments 
would encounter. Respondents were asked to select their most identified concerns in private equity 
investments. 
Institutional background. This enabled appropriate categorisation of the respondent ensuring the right 
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4 Chapter 4: Presentation and analysis of data 
 
This chapter provides a presentation and analysis of the data that were collected through the study. The 
section examines the respondent population and subsequent individual factors such as type of 
respondents and total value of institutional portfolio. Furthermore, analysis is presented on the type of 
asset class the institutional investors hold and whether they invest in private equity. The section also 
present goals of respondents when they invest in private equity and also concerns they have regarding 
private equity as an asset class. 
 
The intent of this study was to examine the attitudes and perceptions towards private equity as an asset 
class in an institutional portfolio.  
4.1 Sample 
 
The sample consisted of a total of 19 institutional investors from South Africa only. From a total potential 
institutional investor population of 367 identified, this represented a response rate of just over six percent. 
 
4.2 Presentation of data 
 
4.2.1 Respondents characterisation 
 
Data on demographic factors were collected on the respondents regarding the organisation type to which 
the respondents belong. Majority of the respondents that represent pension fund as institutional investors 
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Figure 14 provides a histogram of the size of the total fund portfolio of the respondents in South Africa. 
Over 42 per cent of the total institutional portfolios had portfolios of over 10 billion rands. Over 26 per cent 
of the respondents’ portfolios were between R1 – 5 billion. The distribution of the size of the institutional 
portfolio is skewed to the right. The distribution shape is more likely related to the fact that the sample 
size is biased towards large portfolio size. On the other hand, this shape could also indicate that most of 
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Figure 14 : Value of total fund portfolio 
 
4.2.2 Asset class in an institutional portfolio 
 
Table 4 contains the type of asset class by those respondents that currently have in their portfolios other 
than private equity as an asset class (19 respondents). Not surprisingly, 100 per cent of respondents 
invested in equities and bonds. South African Cash was the second most popular type of asset class with 
89 per cent of respondents holding investments in this asset classes. Since questionnaire was targeted at 
organisations with a higher probability of having these three common asset classes in their portfolios this 
bias would be expected. Again, the selection of respondents makes the sample even more biased 
towards portfolios holding SA Equities, SA Bonds and SA Cash. SA Hedge funds was the least popular 
asset class with 21 per cent of respondents holding this asset class. Foreign Equities was also one of the 
most popular asset class with 84 per cent of respondents holding this asset class as. 
 
It is not alarming that SA Hedge Funds are the least popular asset class. As part of SA Regulation 28 
Act, hedge funds are classified as an alternative asset class with a maximum of 10 per cent asset 
allocation allowed by institutional investors.  According to Hood and Nofsinger (2007), institutional 
investors tend to allocate no more than 5 per cent of their portfolio to hedge funds and they are mostly 
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Table 4 : Type of asset class in an institutional portfolio 
 




















































Ennis and Sebastian (2005) stated that investor circumstance should play a role in determining whether 
an allocation to private equity is appropriate and how large it should be. Skill, risk tolerance, liquidity 
requirement, portfolio size, internal resources, board experience, and capacity for confidential dealing can 
all come into play in making the decision. Upon careful consideration, some thoughtful investors will 
rightly decide to exclude private equity from their portfolio.  
4.2.3 Investments in private equity 
Respondents were asked about the percentage of their investments held in the private equity as an asset 
class. According to the Regulation 28 Act, Table 5 shows consistency with regard to asset allocation of 
alternative investment to portfolios. The table also shows that 43 per cent of respondents invest in private 
equity. Between four and five per cent, there was only 11 per cent of respondents that invest in private 
equity. Interestingly, 37 per cent of respondents indicated that they did not hold investment in private 
equity.  
Table 5 : Investments in private equity 
 
Percentage of asset allocation % of respondents 
0 – 2% 
 
42 
2% - 3% 0 
3% - 4% 5 
4%- 5% 11 
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to R1 billion 
R1 billion to 
R5 billion 




0 – 2%: 0% 13% 25% 25% 38% 
2% - 3%: 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3% - 4%: 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 
4%- 5%: 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 
Over 5%: 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 
None: 25% 0% 13% 13% 38% 
Table 6 indicates that asset size was a statistically significant factor to invest in private equity. A 
significant number of respondents with over R10 billion of assets indicated that they hold investment in 
private equity.  According to Chemla (2004) large private equity funds were more likely to invest in private 
equity than small funds. Interestingly, the funds smaller than R1 billion that invested in private equity 
allocated less than two per cent of their assets to this asset class.  
Chemla (2004) obtained US pension fund asset allocation data from Pensions and Investments 
magazine as of September 2001. The 1000 pension funds in the data had total assets of US$4,795 
billion, including US$3,611 billion in defined benefit plans. The data indicated that the 913 funds that had 
a defined benefit component invested on average 1.4% of their assets in private equity, including 0.4% in 
venture capital. Total private equity investment accounted for 3.4% of the total assets of the funds that 
invested in private equity, including 0.8% in venture capital. Out of these 913 funds, 257 invested on 
average 4.9% of their assets in private equity, including 1.9% in venture capital. Total investment in 
private equity amounted to US$108.1bn, including $27.8bn in venture capital. 
Furthermore, Chemla (2004) noted that asset size appeared to be an important determinant of the 
decision to invest in private equity. Specifically, large funds were more likely to invest in private equity: 
About 68% of the funds with assets worth more than $10 billion invested in private equity, but only 12% of 
the funds with assets that were below $1 billion invested in this asset class. Funds that had defined 
benefit assets worth more than US$10bn invested on average 4.4% of their assets in private equity, but 
this percentage only dropped to 0.5% for funds with defined benefit assets smaller than $1 billion. Among 
the funds that invested in private equity, asset size is also important. The funds with assets worth more 
than $10 billion invested 6.6% of their portfolio in this asset class, while funds smaller than $1 billion 
invested 4.5% of their assets.  
Chemla (2004) also did find that among the funds that invest in private equity, the small funds invest 
more in venture capital than the others. This illustrated that large funds tend to invest a larger fraction of 
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4.2.4 Objectives of investor private equity holdings 
 
The institutional investors were asked about what goals they had for their private equity holdings. Their 
answers (see Table 7) show that they expect private equity investment to perform primarily as most 
important goal and secondly as a portfolio diversification asset, with cash flow, tax benefits and portfolio 
regulations as less important goals. The highest goal, with 68 per cent of institutional investors, was 
primarily seeking total expected return, followed by risk diversification which had 53 per cent and third 
was social responsible investment with 47 per cent. Cumming and Johan (2005c) focus on institutional 
investor private equity allocations and provide comparisons to public equity and show similarities in the 
determinants of socially responsible investment for different asset classes. In their study, they show that 
socially responsible investment was more common among institutional investors with a greater 
international investment focus in Europe and the United States relative to domestic Dutch investment and 
investment in Asia. 
 
Table 7 : Goals of institutional investors for their overall portfolio in private equity 
 
 
Furthermore, potential for capital appreciation appeared to be more influential in the institutional 
investors’ decision regarding private equity with 47 per cent of institutional investors indicating it as their 
fourth primary goal. Moreover, government subsidies and tax benefits did not appear to be incentive in 
investing in private equity. 
 
It is interesting to note that 26 per cent of respondents in the present survey nominated economic 
upliftment as the most important reason to hold private equity. This validated a survey done by the DBSA 
and SAVCA that highlighted the broader social and economic impact that private equity has had in South 
Africa as a whole. Lack of other investment opportunities elsewhere factor appeared to be less influential 
in the institutional investors’ decisions regarding private equity.  
  % of respondents 
 
Potential for capital appreciation 
 
 37 
Cash flow  0 
Total expected return  68 
Risk diversification  53 




Other governmental subsidies  5 




Portfolio regulations  0 
Socially responsible investment  47 
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4.2.5 Benchmark of private equity returns 
 
Institutional investors were also asked about what benchmark they had use for their private equity 
investments. 
 
Figure 15: Benchmark of private equity returns 
 
Figure 15 shows that All Share Index is the most important benchmark measure of private equity returns 
by institutional investors followed by Headline Inflation as a second preferred benchmark. Standard 
indices, such as the S&P500 and All Share Index provide measures of overall market returns and tend to 
act as benchmark for private equity returns as previously mentioned in the literature section. 
 
According to Frei and Studer (2004) highlighted various reasons why performance measurements for PE 
investments are more complicated than for traditional financial investments. Frei and Studer (2004) used 
listed indices such as NASDAQ Composite index. All PE investments were benchmarked against the 
S&P 500 index for U.S. investments and the MSCl Europe Total Return Index for European investments. 
Their study concluded that Private equity did, on average, outperform public equity markets by around 
5% in Europe and around 3% in the U.S. Note, however, that the geometric average return of the chosen 
benchmark index for the European investments (8.7%)  over the 15-year period from 1988 until 2002 was 
2.7% lower than the return of the chosen benchmark index for the U.S. investments (11.5%). However 
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4.2.6 Institutional experiences regarding private equity 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of the investors’ perception regarding the problems associated 
with the private equity sector, the respondents were asked to rank what they considered to be the top 
problems in order of importance. These rankings are shown in the frequency Table 8. 
 
The rankings in Table 8 seem to indicate that the majority of respondents perceive lack of liquidity issues 
as being the key problems associated with investing in the private equity sector. Shortage of day, with 53 
per cent of institutional investors, was the second most problem in investment in private equity. Concerns 
surrounding poor market information and lack of transparency with 47 per cent respectively come as a 
third factors associated with problems in private equity sector. Unsurprisingly, the respondents referred to 
the regulatory, political and social risks are to be a much less important problem associated with investing 
in private equity.  
 
Lack of liquidity seems to have a significant influence over the respondents’ investment strategy. Private 
equity investment is essentially illiquid (Sahlmann, 1990, Lerner and Schoar, 2003). Most pension fund 
managers that responded to our survey agreed with the fact that liquidity was a problem that could 
restrict private equity investment.  According to Ennis and Sebastian (2005) illiquidity of private 
investments is another area that deserves attention. The less an investor needs liquidity, the greater is 
the tolerance for private equity investments. This rules them out for participant-directed defined 
contribution plans, but some give-up in liquidity need not be a significant barrier for many defined benefit 
pension plans, endowments, or foundation funds. While most of an investor’s assets will be able to be 
sold fairly easily on the market at a fair price, private equity investments may not be able to be sold at all, 
and if they are it will usually be at a significant discount. In fact, the return on most funds is negative in its 
beginning stages, as early losses are taken before significant gains, a phenomenon known as the J-
curve. 
 
Table 8 : Problems regarding private equity investment 
 Responses Percent 
Shortage of data 10 53 
Lack of transparency 9 47 
Poor market information 9 47 
Low returns 0 0 
Tenancy regulation                       1 5 
Amount of profit they take (fees) 7 37 
Integrity of investors 2 11 
Lack of liquidity 14 74 
Lack of fund management expertise 5 26 
Regulatory, political and social risks 2 11 
Small universe of investment 9 47 
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Cumming and Johan (2005a) carried out a survey of Dutch institutional investors in 2005. The survey 
data comprise information from 100 Dutch institutions (pension funds, insurance companies and banks), 
29 of which are currently investing in private equity and 35 of which plan on investing in private equity 
over the period 2006-2010. On average, the most important risk faced by institutional investors is the 
illiquidity of the investment and lack of performance transparency (both ranked an average of 3.7 on a 1 – 
5 scale where 5 is the highest). Private equity investments can take many years to bring to fruition 
(typically at least 2 years) in an exit event. 
 
With regard to lack of transparency, Cumming and Johan (2005a) believed however that such additional, 
more informative disclosure of performance results should not be an issue of argument among private 
equity fund managers and their institutional investors as the “public” dissemination of such information 
will be limited to the extent that the “public” has a legal right to the information. The “public” who invest in 
a certain insurance company should have access to the details of that insurance company’s investments. 
The “public” who are required to place their pension fund with a certain company should have access to 
the financial details of that company. The “public” however will not have a right to access the financial 
report provided by a private equity fund to its wealthy private limited partner. This is also the case for a 
limited partner which is also an institution utilizing only private funds. Thus to say that the financial 
information will be made totally public will be an overstatement. This does not mean that specific 
investment details would be made public, as that level of detail would likely be detrimental to the private 
equity fund as well as its investee companies. 
 
However, annual aggregate portfolio valuations of a private equity funds do not disclose any individual 
investment details, and yet such aggregated valuations would enable institutional investors to make more 
informed decisions about whether to invest in private equity. In turn, as mentioned earlier in the literature 
section, institutional investors should also be required to disclose the “valuation” of their private equity 
investments in their annual accounts, to allow their own “public” investors to make informed decisions 
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5 Chapter 5: Summary 
5.1 Summary overview of the study 
 
This research study analysed the institutional perceptions of private equity as an asset class in an 
institutional portfolio. In order to understand private equity history, characteristics and aspects evolve 
around private equity have been discussed. This section will discuss the conclusion and 
recommendations based on the literature review and results. 
 
Chapter one discussed the background to the study, followed by the problem statement and research 
objectives. 
 
Chapter two concentrated on literature review and presented history, definitions and characteristics of 
private equity.  
 
The chapter also looked at influence of Black Equity Empowerment as a major player in private equity in 
South Africa.  
 
The chapter reviewed literature on performance of private equity. There have been numerous studies 
conducted around return of private equity funds relative to investments in public equity. Interestingly, 
private equity in South Africa has performed better than public equity. In Europe and United States, this 
has also been a trend according to the studies conducted. 
 
The chapter touched on risk and return of private equity in institutional portfolios. Various studies suggest 
that there are various measures one can apply to measure associated risk and return of private equity. 
Most studies suggest use of Internal Rate of Return as the most appropriate measure of benchmark. 
Public Markets Equivalent is a common measure among institutional investors to measure private equity. 
 
Portfolio management together with asset allocation decision is also reviewed. Institutional investors who 
have large portfolios are more comfortable allocating assets to private equity and illiquidity is not a major 
concern as there are available assets. 
 
Regulatory framework of private equity was also discussed. The chapter touched on South African 
regulatory framework and international regulatory studies conducted around this asset class. 
 
Chapter three focused on the research design and methodology used in the research. 
 
Chapter four presents the results of the research obtained from empirical investigation conducted 
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5.2 Key findings 
 
With regard to goals of investing in private equity, higher returns and potential for capital appreciation 
appeared to be more influential in the institutional investors’ decision regarding private equity. It is also 
interesting to note that a number respondents in the present survey nominated economic upliftment as 
the most important reason to hold private equity. 
 
Most importantly, a benchmark measure of private equity returns by institutional investors was public 
market index followed by Headline Inflation as a second preferred benchmark. 
 
The study found that illiquidity is a major concern which agrees with literature. According to Ennis and 
Sebastian (2005) illiquidity of private investments is another area that deserves attention. The less an 
investor needs liquidity, the greater is the tolerance for private equity investments. While most of an 
investor’s assets will be able to be sold fairly easily on the market at a fair price, private equity 
investments may not be able to be sold at all, and if they are it will usually be at a significant discount. In 
addition to the illiquidity, an investment in a private equity fund has a long time horizon. The typical fund 
lasts up to 10 years, and it is usually many years before the committed capital is returned.  
 
Overall, the development of pooled investment vehicles, such as funds of funds, may encourage small 
pension funds to invest in private equity. They may reduce the cost of investing in this asset class as well 
as the illiquidity that is inherent to private equity. 
 
Large funds were more likely to invest in private equity than small funds. Specifically, funds with assets 
that exceeded R10billion invested in private equity, while only small funds with assets worth less than 
R500 million have not invested in this asset class. Asset size was a statistically significant factor to invest 
in private equity. 
 
Shortage of data is a seco d major concern with regard to investing in the private equity sector. The 
enhanced information flow on private equity can help to manage investors’ expectations and reduces the 
perceived risk of the asset class by giving account of historical performances. 
5.3 Limitation of the study 
 
A number of limitations were identified whilst conducting the research study. Institutional investors were 
reluctant to give information about management of their portfolio and their involvement in private equity 
due to sensitivity of the subject. 
 
Another limitation concerns the common method bias, which arises when a common method (such as a 
survey instrument) is used to gather data. Some of the institutional investors were unable to open the 
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5.4 Further research 
 
Relatively little research has been done on private equity in South Africa so far. The most comprehensive 
research on the topic is probably the paper by Missankov et al., (2006). There is ample opportunity for 
further research in the field. 
 
The study's findings open multiple avenues for research concerning the influence of perceived risk on the 
decision-making process of institutional investors. Another intriguing opportunity for further inquiry relates 
to assessing the relationship between institutional investors’ risk perceptions and their subsequent 
investment decision making within a behavioural decision-making framework in their portfolio. 
 
Other research areas; 
 How illiquidity setback can be solved to encourage flows into this asset class? 
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7 APPENDIX 
7.1 Ethics letter of approval 
 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
, 
Courier: 
Ms Akhon~ Ngwa ne 
Department of Account ing 
University of Cape Town 
a ngwa ne@ investec.co.I<l 
Dear Ms Ngwane 
Faculty of Commerce 
Ethics in Research Committee 
Room 2.21 Les lie Comm~fce Build il\lJ Upper Olmpus University of cape Town 
Post: University of cape Town • Private Bag • Roodebosch 7701 
Email : !rwin.brown@oct.ftc.Z!! 
Telephone: +27 21 65(}-2311 
Fax No.: +27 21 689-7570 
28 November 2011 
Project title: Privilte equity as iln ilsset cliiSS in iln institutionill portfolio 
This letter serves to confirm that the project entit led, NPriviite I!quity a§ all ilS§l!t dilss in iln 
institutional portfolio", as described in your fina l subm itted protocol dated 4 July 2011, has 
been approved. You m ay proceed with the re~eil rch . 
Plea5e note that if you make any substantial change in your research procedure that could 
affect the experiences of the pa rt icipants, you must submit a revised protocol t o the 
Committee for approval. 
Best wishes for great success with your research. 
Regards, 
J :JJ2WJY.N 
Prof Irwin Brown 
Commerce Faculty Ethics in Research Committee 
·OUR MISSION is to be outst8ndlng te.!lch ing and research un iversrtv. 
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7.2 Letter to respondents 
  
./ <~., 
t .• ) UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
. " 
De~r Sir/Madam 
Survey Or) i l!v~strlll!tlt In p r1v~te eguilV 
Department of Accounting 
LfI5~ &"') :':"U 
~ """ I.p::!9 CiI::rlu 
0?_1hJ X:~· In~H"""'" I/~ 
Je",n:""~: Il"'l ) 'd}.?:;1'1'1 
Jc.N6I I:J:<I ) 29-7581 
tn"<..~ .. .., .. , rxrrrrc =-,~.,.a::: m'<ICCOI.. w.g 
I <lm (llITen!,.,. studying towards ~ M il ~ !ers deg ree in fin.1ncl.11 M~ natemen! al the Unive rsity of t:~ pe 
Towll. My thesis is on the llnderstlldled area of Investment in the priv<lte equity !>ector by South 
Mri.:an fund~. 
I con tacted your company telepho nlca l ~/ and askl'd for the (ontaci dctall, of the fund manager; thus 
this emi i l r@ achi ne you. P I ~ a 5~ note tha t individual flrms;, fun ds or persons wi ll not be id~ nt lfi ed in 
the thesis. Al l responses wil l be t reated confident ially and allllnyr"Ulisly. Upon completion, results 
will be m~de available to you at your requ .. st. 
Your pan ic ipation Is crudal to the Sllen 'ss of the stLKIy aud i~ " fea tty apprCl: iated. 
Yo urs sincere ly, 
Akhona Ngwanl! 
Masters In Financial Management C,lndidiite 
University 01 Cape Town 
Mobile: 082 720 1Y42 
..... > O"5li :)l,~·~~ ;r, U'.=;.o ··." ... I. 'J'""C",","''''''''''''''' 















1. What is the approximate value of your total fund portfolio? 
 Under R500 million 
 R500 million to R1 billion 
 R1 billion to R5 billion 
 R5 billion to R10 billion 
 Over R10 billion 
 
2. For what types of asset classes are you currently holding on your portfolio: 
 SA Equities 
 SA Bonds 
 SA Property 
 SA Cash 
 SA Hedge Funds 
 Foreign Equities 
 Foreign Bonds 
 Other (specify) ____________________________________________  
  
3. What is the approximate percentage of your investment in the private equity sector? 
 0 – 2% 
 2% - 3% 
 3% - 4% 
 4%- 5% 
 Over 5% 
 None 
 
4. Please select below typical primary goals in investing into private equity investment  
 Potential for capital appreciation ___ 
 Cash flow ___ 
 Total expected return ___ 
 Risk diversification ___ 
 Match against liabilities ___ 
 Tax benefits ___ 
 Other governmental subsidies ___ 
 Lack of other investment opportunities elsewhere ___ 
 Portfolio regulations ___ 
 Socially responsible investment ___ 
 Economic upliftment ___ 
 Other (please specify) _________ ___ 
 
5. Your typical benchmark index on your private equity returns: 
 All Share Index 
 All Bond Index 
 Cash 
 Headline Inflation 
 MSCI Emerging Market Index 
 Peer group of private equity funds 
 Other _____________ 
6. Please choose the following items regarding problems in private equity investment 
 Shortage of data 
 Lack of transparency 
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 Low returns 
 Tenancy regulation  
 Amount of profit they take (fees) 
 Integrity of investors 
 Lack of liquidity 
 Lack of fund management expertise  
 Regulatory, political and social risks 
 Small universe of investment 
Optional: 
Organisation name:___________________________________________ 
Interviewee’s position within the organisation:____________   
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7.4 Standard results 
 
 
7.4.1  What is the approximate value of your total fund portfolio? 
 
















to R1 billion 
R1 billion to 
R5 billion 





















SA Bonds: SA 
Property: 
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7.4.3 What is the approximate percentage of your investment in the private equity sector? 
 
Percentage of asset allocation % of respondents 
 
0 – 2% 
 
42 
2% - 3% 0 
3% - 4% 5 
4%- 5% 11 


















7.4.4 Please select below typical primary goals in investing into private equity investment 
 
 Responses % of respondents 




Cash flow: 0 0% 
Total expected return: 13 68% 
Risk diversification: 10 53% 
Match against liabilities: 2 11% 
Tax benefits: 0 
 
0% 
Other governmental subsidies: 1 5% 
Lack of other investment opportunities elsewhere: 1 
 
5% 
Portfolio regulations: 0 0% 
Socially responsible investment: 9 47% 
Economic upliftment: 5 26% 
 
 
7.4.5 Your typical benchmark index on your private equity returns 
 
 Responses % of respondents 
All Share Index 6 32% 
All Bond Index 0 
 
0% 
Cash 1 5% 
Headline Inflation 5 
 
26% 
MSCI Emerging Market Index 0 0% 
Peer group of private equity funds: 3 
 
16% 
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7.4.6 Please choose the following items regarding problems in private equity investment 
 
 Responses % of respondents 
Shortage of data 10 53% 
Lack of transparency 9 47% 
Poor market information 9 47% 
Low returns 0 0% 
Tenancy regulation 1 5% 
Amount of profit they take (fees) 7 37% 
Integrity of investors 2 11% 
Lack of liquidity 14 74% 
Lack of fund management expertise 5 26% 
Regulatory, political and social risks 2 11% 
Small universe of investment 9 47% 
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